Discussion Papers 1998. No. 22.
Changes in the Politico-Geographical
Position of Hungary in the 20th Century
CENTRE FOR REGIONAL STUDIES
OF HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
DISCUSSION PAPERS
No. 22
Changes in the Politico-geographical
Position of Hungary in the
20th Century
by
Zoltan HAJDU
Series editor
Zoltan GAL
Pecs
1998
Discussion Papers 1998. No. 22.
Changes in the Politico-Geographical
Position of Hungary in the 20th Century
Publishing of this paper is supported by the
Research Fund of the Centre for Regional Studies, Hungary
ISSN 0238-2008
0 1998 by Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Technical editor: Ilona Csapo, Zoltan Gal
Maps: Valeria Fonyodi
Typeset by Centre for Regional Studies of HAS Printed in Hungary by Siimegi
Nyomdaipari, Kereskedelmi es Szolgaltato Ltd., Pecs
Discussion Papers 1998. No. 22.
Changes in the Politico-Geographical
Position of Hungary in the 20th Century
CONTENTS
1 Introduction / 7
2 The politico-geographical position as a historically changing, relative cate-
gory / 9
3 The politico-geographical position of the Austro—Hungarian Monarchy
within Europe, the situation of Hungary within the Monarchy,
1900-1918 / 12
3.1 The politico-geographical position of the Monarchy within Europe / 12
3.2 The politico-geographical position of Hungary within the
Monarchy / 18
4 The situation of Hungary in the time of the transition after World War I,
1918-1920 / 20
5 The changes of the politico-geographical position of Hungary in the period
between the two world wars / 24
5.1 Relationships to the great powers / 25
5.2 Neighbourhood connections / 29
6 The dilemma of the loser Hungary and the victorious great powers,
1944-1948 / 34
7 In the alliance system of the Soviet Union, 1949-1991 / 39
7.1 The building out and questioning of the socialist alliance system,
1949-1956 / 39
7.2 The interaction of the home and foreign policy (Hungary as the "most
cheerful barrack" of the socialist camp) / 43
7.3 From the economic crisis through the social crisis to the political sys-
temic change / 50
8 Hungary in the "grey zone":
Out of the Warsaw Treaty and the COMECON — but where? / 54
9 At the door of the NATO, in the waiting room of the European Union / 59
9.1 At the door of the NATO / 59
9.2 In the waiting room of the European Union / 60
10 Summary / 62
Oibliography / 64
Discussion Papers 1998. No. 22.
Changes in the Politico-Geographical
Position of Hungary in the 20th Century
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: The Austro—Hungarian Monarchy in 1914 / 13
Figure 2: The division of the Austro—Hungarian Monarchy and the succesor
states / 17
Figure 3: The territorial division of the historical Hungary / 22
Figure 4: The territorial fragmentation and distribution of the Hungarian ethnic
population, 1920 / 23
Figure 5: The changes of the territory of Hungary, 1938-1947 / 30
Figure 6: The divided Europe, 1955 / 42
Figure 7: The allocation of the Soviet military bases in Hungary, 1989 / 48
Figure 8: The new neighbour states of Hungary, 1993 / 58
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Disintegration of historical Hungary after the Trianon Peace
Treaty / 21
Table 2: Hungary and neighboring countries, 1923 / 24
Table 3: Hungary and neighboring countries, 1993 / 57
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
1 Introduction
The geographical position describes on the one hand the global determination of a
country (absolute geographical position), and its (relative) position compared to
the other countries. The politico-geographical position shows the place of a coun-
try in the international political space. The politico-geographical position is a cate-
gory that changes in course of history and has a relative content and value. The
judgement of the politico-geographical location of an individual country has
changed very much both at international and national level in political geography.
The changes of the politico-geographical location of a country are influenced
by global, continental, neighbourhood and internal processes. In the 20th century,
the continental and the global processes were predominant in determining the po-
litico-geographical position of almost all countries.
The territory of Hungary and its character changed within extremely broad
frameworks during the 20th century. When making historical analyses, we always
have to be aware which country borders the assessments are based on, because the
transition processes can only be assessed realistically if the real situation and the
real politico-geographical environment are taken into consideration.
Not only the territory of Hungary, but also its status in its region, and its re-
gional and continental power position changed very much during the 20th century.
In the first period of the 20th century, Hungary was part of a European great power
(only middle power by many opinions) which was historically determined in many
respects. After 1920, Hungary became a small state, forced within an internation-
ally limited sphere of action, while in the period of the enlargements of 1938-
1941, Hungary increased in figures (territory, population, economic performance,
number of the army troops), but its possibilities were in reality more and more re-
stricted by the direct influence and later control of the 3rd German Empire.
Following World War II, Hungary gradually integrated into the politico-
geographical structures of the divided world and the divided Europe. In 1956, a
significant part of the Hungarian population questioned this integration and also
the inner structure of the country, but finally it was the international determina-
tions and the crude military force that created an "order" built on the old realities.
Hungary, determined by its small size, was integrated into the socialist system,
above all into the economic, political and military structure of the Soviet Union.
From 1988, the legitimacy of the integration into the "peace camp" was gradu-
ally questioned in Hungary, followed by the disintegration of the country from its
former treaty of allied countries — which treaty changed fundamentally in the be-
ginning, still it could not avoid falling apart afterwards —, and by 1991 Hungary re-
gained its sovereignty in all respects. This fundamental turn was allowed by the
favourable internal and external conditions and possibilities.
7
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
After 1991, Hungary became part of the "grey zone" that emerged between the
stable West, and the "East" (a part of the ex-socialist countries and the successor
states of the Soviet Union), struggling with repeating crises. It was Hungary's own
decision to break away from this zone, also to become a member of the NATO and
the European Union. The Hungarian population legitimised its determination for
the NATO membership in a referendum.
The politico-geographical position of Hungary and the changes of that can be
analysed any judged in several spatial respects in any period of time:
• within the state structure (period of the Austro—Hungarian Monarchy);
• in the relationships and connections to the neighbouring states;
• in spatial community aspect (Central Europe);
• functional large space (grey zone);
• at continental level (Europe) and
• at the level of the global processes.
In the individual historical situations, it was always different elements that were
dominant. In our opinion, the politico-geographical position of Hungary was
mainly shaped by the global and European processes (World War I and World War
II, and the divided, bipolar world). These macro-structural effects determined the
development of the neighbourhood environment of Hungary (Treaty of Trianon
and of Paris, the Soviet—American deals made in Malta). Still, in the analysis we
only shortly look at these essential processes and focus on the neighbourhood con-
nections, because we do believe that the Hungarian public thinking has been more
thoroughly touched by the neighbourhood connections, and because of the Hun-
garian minority living in the neighbouring countries, these neighbourhood connec-
tions still have a dominant influence on the development of our European politics
in many respects.
Until 1988 our analysis is mainly a summary, a review, while the processes that
have passed since the systemic change are dealt with in more details. Our primary
objective is the introduction of the historically changing politico-geographical po-
sition of Hungary, and an analysis of the adjustment of the country to the new
global, European and neighbourhood situation continuously changing since the
1990s.
8
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
2 The politico-geographical position as a historically changing,
relative category
We have to take it as natural that each country looks at the world, the continent
which it is in, and the neighbouring countries from its absolute geographical posi-
tion. In the Hungarian historical and political thinking too, a kind of Hungarian
worldview was born, in which Hungary had a central position. Even if not often,
but a Budapest centred map of the world was talked about, however, that did not
become a dominant element of either the public thinking or the school education.
In the Hungarian education and public thinking, the Europe-centred worldview
became more prevalent.
The politico-geographical position of Hungary can be stated as a relative cate-
gory, which has had and still has both inner and outer content and determination.
The inner content can be defined as the determination and orientation of the values
of the current political elite, or in a broader sense, the "neighbourhood con-
science", "sense of safety", "spatial community conscience" and "legitimacy of the
alliance" by the whole of the society.
The inner determinations of the politico-geographical position can be consid-
erably different at the different social groups: even the leading political elite can
judge differently the directions and the content of the foreign orientation and the
alliance connections of the country. (For example, the neighbourhood of the 3rd
German Empire after the annexation of Austria had a different meaning for those
who sympathised with the Germans and those who urged an English orientation.)
It is characteristic of the Hungarian development that the politico-geographical
position of the country and the favourable or unfavourable nature thereof were
judged differently by the political emigrants in different periods of time and with
different ideological backgrounds (after 1849, 1919, 1945, 1956) than by the cur-
rent state power.
The lack of a total social consensus took a special form with respect to the
judgement of the Hungarian—Soviet "fraternal and everlasting friendship" and the
alliance and neighbourhood of tbe Soviet Union. For a significant part of the Hun-
garian society, this alliance connection and obligation remained unacceptable, al-
though this aversion could not be stated and revealed for several decades.
The outer content of the politico-geographical position mainly means the
judgement of the participation of Hungary in the neighbourhood, spatial commu-
nity, European and global processes. The judgement of both the neighbours and
the continental actors may change in a short time, and as it is proved by the Hun-
garian development, it has changed several times and radically during the 20th
century.
In the 20th century, the current Hungary adjusted itself to the European territo-
rial, economic and power structure, together with its neighbours of the time. Hun-
9
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
gary and its neighbourhood made the most changeable region within the often
changing European structures.
Hungary has existed within borders which significantly changed many times,
and the self-definition of the geographical position of Hungary in the 20 th century
has also changed very often. Hungary has already been considered as an "Eastern"
and "Western", Southeast European, Balkan, South European, Southwest Euro-
pean, Central European, Central-Eastern European, East-Central European etc.
country (Ring, E. ed. 1986 Each definition of the space had direct outer and
inner political elements. These self-defining efforts, partly co-existing in history,
also showed that no consensus was achieved in the Hungarian society in this re-
spect, either.
It is a dominant feature of the broader region of Hungary that after the elimina-
tion of the Austro—Hungarian Monarchy, it has been a buffer zone between the
empires or great powers almost all through the 20th century. A dominant element
here is the space of influence and the pressure of Germany and Russia. In compari-
son with them, the rising Italian and the completely devastating Turkish power
should be considered as auxiliary in importance. The different imperial and power
efforts were usually escorted by efforts concerning certain large regions and func-
tional spatial communities.
The perception of Hungary by the neighbours can also be problematic. The
population, the political elite and partly the scientific life of the successor states
considered Hungary not in its actual form after 1920, but they saw the size, signifi-
cance and possibilities of Hungary before 1918. The successor states did not really
make their foreign political and alliance efforts according to the real conditions of
power.
In the early 20th century, the state structure and the inner politico-geographical
position also developed in an incredibly complex way (within the historical state
borders, Hungary—Croatia, and the two states of the Monarchy, Austria and Hun-
gary). It was partly the debates about the inner structure that finally led to the sig-
nificant change of the external conditions and the disintegration of the state struc-
ture.
The ethnic neighbourhood environment of Hungary was quite stable in the 20th
century, but the weight and role of some ethnic groups have significantly changed.
While the Ukrainians for example hardly played any role in the Hungarian proc-
esses for decades, after 1991 Ukraine became the most populated and from mili-
tary aspects the strongest neighbour of Hungary. The transition of the ethnic space
was complemented by the voluntary and forced international migrations, and the
occasionally very different natural movements of the different ethnic groups.
The territorial division of the Hungarian ethnic group and nation after 1920 ba-
sically changed the connections of the now independent Hungary to its neighbour-
hood, its bilateral inter-state connections, and the conditions of the foreign and
10
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
national policy. The current Hungarian foreign policy had to give an answer,
among other things, to the dividedness of the nation.
The direct neighbourhood of the great powers (Germany 1938-1945, Soviet
Union 1939-1941, 1945-1991) always had a dominant effect on the development
of Hungary. The neighbourhood turned to occupation for a shorter or longer period
in both cases. After 1945, the Soviet Union was an inner and an outer factor at the
same time, because of the occupation (which was even internationally legitimised
until 1955), and in effect it determined the possible frameworks of the develop-
ment of Hungary.
In the period after 1988, the inner development of Hungary was defined by the
lasting inner crisis of the Soviet Union, its rapidly weakening world power and
world political positions, and by the internal transformation of the neighbouring
socialist states. This new situation offered new possibilities for Hungary to change
its politico-geographical position.
The Hungarian foreign policy always had to consider the facts coming from the
absolute politico-geographical position of the country (Balogh, S. 1986; Herczegh,
G. 1986; Juhcisz, Gy. 1969; &liras, M 1985, 1987), as well as the rearrangement
processes going on at global, continental and neighbourhood level (Kennedy, P.
1992; Fischer, F. 1992, 1996; Rourke, J. T. 1991; Lendvai, L. F. 1997). We could
as well draw the conclusions from the historical failures or even tragedies of the
20th century Hungarian state—national—foreign policy that the Hungarian foreign
policy was almost always wrong, almost always misjudged the long-term devel-
opment of the external conditions — but this judgement would only be part of the
truth. Most of the neighbouring countries also experienced the tragedies of the
20th century, so it is rather regional and continental features than individual prob-
lems (the incompetence or lack of authority of the politicians, maybe foreign poli-
ticians of the individual countries).
11
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
3 The politico-geographical position of the Austro—Hungarian
Monarchy within Europe, the situation of Hungary within the
Monarchy, 1900-1918
Because of the complicated state structure, our analysis must contain at least two
(and introversive and an extroversive) approaches. The Austro—Hungarian Monar-
chy seemed to be and acted as a single unit "outwards", to Europe and the world,
at the same time, the state structure was often debated from the inside, both by the
two major nations making the state and by the minorities. The economic and mili-
tary performance, and the political effectiveness and stability of the Monarchy was
considerably weaker than in the case of countries with a more homogeneous ethnic
composition. Inside, the signs of the lack of the unity already appeared in many
respects.
3.1 The politico-geographical position of the Monarchy within Europe
Europe on the turn of the 19th and 20th century showed the results of the long-
term historical processes and the consequences of the extremely intensive and in-
fluential rearrangement processes of the last third of the 19th century. The state
policies and philosophies of the modern state building, and the traditional dynastic
approach co-existed and influenced each other in the alliance-making efforts of the
individual states (Pounds, N. J. G. 1997).
Europe in the beginning of the 20th century was the Europe of the historical
empires and the large countries. The Monarchy in the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury was a traditional, historically accepted great power, and considered as a par-
ticipant in shaping the European processes, being part of the European balance of
power. The Monarchy, despite its colonisation efforts, remained a basically Euro-
pean, inland power, without a real weight in world politics.
Considering its territory, the Monarchy was the second largest country in
Europe (676 443 km2), following Russia. The centre of the territory of the Monar-
chy was the Vienna—Budapest axis, thus the country was called the "Danubian
Monarchy" by many. The Monarchy, although it had an Adriatic coast of signifi-
cant length, important ports and a considerable fleet, could still be taken as an in-
land power.
By population, the Monarchy was the third country in Europe (with 51 million
inhabitants), after Russia and Germany. The population of the Monarchy was ex-
tremely complex, neither state founding nations (the Germans or the Hungarians)
had a dominant weight within the whole of the Monarchy, in fact, within their own
countries.
12
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
The economic performance of the Monarchy within Europe was lower than its
weight by territory or population. The modernisation of the economy was belated
compared to England, France or Germany, also, it had a specific structure. Com-
pared to Russia, the Monarchy had a competitive, modern economic structure.
The European and neighbourhood environment of the Monarchy showed both
favourable and unfavourable characters in 1914 (Figure 1). Italy, Switzerland,
Liechtenstein, Germany, Russia, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and the Adriatic
Sea meant different historical connections and experiences, and the neighbourhood
contained versatile possibilities and constraints.
Figure 1
The Austro—Hungarian Monarchy in 1914
13
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
The sphere of action of the foreign policy depends on the objectives, values, di-
rections and value system defined by the leading elite. A foreign policy option for
the Monarchy was offered by the connections to Germany, Russia, or Italy, also,
the closeness to the marginal powers from geographical aspect, above all Turkey,
and the relationship and connections with the European great powers marginal in
the geographical sense of the word (Great Britain and France), and the rising USA.
The foreign policy objectives and orientation of the two dominants, state-
forming nations of the Monarchy were different in almost all neighbourhood rela-
tions. (The judgement of the neighbourhood of Switzerland and Liechtenstein was
not different in the Austrian and Hungarian foreign policy approach.)
Italy was a potential ally and an enemy at the same time. The French—Italian
and the Italian—English connections were largely influenced by the competition for
the colonies in Africa. For Italy, the basic issue was the optimisation of the Euro-
pean and colonisation efforts. For the Austrians, the birth of the single, united It-
aly, and the gradual displacement of Austria from Italy was a historical loss and
grievance. The 1882 triple treaty of Germany, Italy and Austria—Hungary satisfied
the minimum needs of all contracting parties, but the Italian claim for Trieste and
its environs and for other territories complicated the connections immediately.
There was no conflict concerning territorial claims, or any other interest conflict
between the Hungarian party and Italy, in fact, because of the fact that Italy gave
home to Lajos Kossuth in his exile, the majority of the Hungarian society felt
sympathy, hope and respect for Turin for decades. In World War I, Italy finally
fought against the Central Powers, and although the military role of Italy was not
really dominant, it sometimes absorbed significant forces.
Germany, created with the leadership of Prussia, from an enemy gradually be-
came the most important ally for Austria. The friendship of the Austrians towards
Germany is based on linguistic and cultural grounds, and after getting over the
shock caused by the creation of the Little German Unity, the country was open
towards the new German Empire. For the Austrians, the relationship to Germany
for a long time depended on the often changing conditions of the relationship to
France, Italy and Russia. For the Hungarian party, the relationship to Germany was
not so important in itself, rather in the light of the German—Russian relationship
and the connections between the Hungarians and Russia. Germany finally shaped
its alliances and external relations according to its own interests. Although a
dominant force of the Central Powers, Germany proved to be weak in the pro-
longed World War I.
Russia, by its assistance given for the repression the Hungarian war of inde-
pendence in 1849, achieved the sympathy of the Austrians, while the same action
evoked a long-term hatred in the Hungarians against Russia. In the relationship
between the Monarchy and Russia, the potential alliance, the neutral co-existence
as competitors, and the possibility of becoming enemies of each other were all pre-
14
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
sent. Both the Monarchy and Russia (together with Germany) were interested in
the division and the further invasion of Poland, so this common interest could as
well have made them strategic allies for each other (the alliance of the three em-
perors). Finally, the relationship between the Monarchy and Russia turned to hos-
tility, due to the competition in the Balkan area. During the events and battles of
World War I, the Monarchy proved to be weak against Russia, and was only able
to "hold" the Russian front with the assistance of Germany. The revolution in 1917
brought fundamental changes in almost all respects, both in the situation of Russia
and the politics of Europe.
The relationship between the Monarchy and Rumania was determined by the
dual and often changing interests and relationships of the latter state. In 1883, Ru-
mania allied with the Monarchy, in a fear of the Russians, then it more and more
openly stated its territorial claims towards the Monarchy, above all Hungary. In the
middle of World War I, Rumania clearly became an enemy, it was defeated and
forced to sign a separate peace treaty, still, at the end of the war, Rumania found
itself among the winners.
The connection between the Monarchy and Serbia was mostly a definite hostil-
ity, mainly depending on the development of the relationship of the Monarchy to
Russia. There were huge differences between the two countries in all respects. The
opposition of the Monarchy and Serbia led to the chain reaction of the declarations
of war in World War I. Serbia then became one of the biggest winners of World
War I, if we look at its territorial gains.
The neighbourhood connection between the Monarchy and Montenegro was
determined by the economic dependence of the latter, but this small state often
received an interest exceeding its weight. During the world war, Montenegro be-
came a military enemy of the Monarchy.
By the Adriatic Sea, the Monarchy was considered as an inland-sea power, but
it never became a real sea power. The Adriatic Sea was important in merchant
shipping, only. Both the biggest port of the Adriatic Sea (Trieste) and the only im-
portant seaport of Hungary (Fiume/Rijeka) had significant turnovers.
The relationship between the Monarchy and Turkey was often burdened with
conflicts, because of Bosnia—Herzegovina (1878, 1908) and the so-called Sanjak
area. Later, because of the location of the new states created by the achievements
of the national movements in the Balkans, Turkey ceased to be a direct neighbour
of the Monarchy. However, because of their common interests, they related to each
other as "close neighbours", because of the Balkans. Turkey finally joined the war
on the side of the central powers. The fear of Turkey of the Russian extension was
bigger than its aversion towards the increase of the weight of the Monarchy in the
Balkan area.
The relationship between the Monarchy and the geographically peripheral great
powers (Great Britain and France) was contradictory both before and after the turn
15
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
of the century. The connections were determined by the mutual and multilateral
relationships to Germany and Russia, then the support for the nationalist move-
ments aiming at the secession from the Monarchy became the focal point of the
debates. There were no insoluble, direct oppositions between the Monarchy and
the two sea powers; still, they were confronted during the world war, because of
the power politics and the complex interests of the alliances.
The leading elite of the Monarchy did not recognise the growing importance of
the USA in the world economy and the world politics. The Monarchy only attrib-
uted a secondary importance to the USA, while the Czech nationalist movement,
which aimed at the secession from the Monarchy, was probably among the first
ones to realise the probable future role and possibilities of the States. The USA
entered the war primarily not because of its bilateral connection to the Monarchy,
but driven by European and global power aspects.
In World War I, Germany, the Monarchy and their allies entering the war later
(Bulgaria and Turkey) were defeated by the Entente powers, even more by the
United States of America that joined the war with new forces. The war, that was
unjust and imperialistic on both sides and aimed at the territorial re-division of the
world and Europe, finished a historical period and at the same time initiated new
processes.
With the defeat in 1918, the disintegration process of the Monarchy accelerated
within a short time (Figure 2). A dominant element in this disintegration process
was the change in the external conditions (in the eyes of the English, the Monarchy
lost its significance in the European balance of power, the 14 points of the Ameri-
can president, Wilson were about a new order), as well as the internal transition,
the national rearrangement process.
By the tearing apart of the Monarchy, the system of small states was created in
Central Europe, and at the same time a political and power vacuum in the Danu-
bian region, which the French tried to fill out. However, neither their economic nor
their political weight was sufficient for a long-term influence on the whole of the
region.
16
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
tes
ta
s
sor
ucce
s
he
d t
an
hy
rc
Mona
ian
ar
Hung
—
tro
Aus
t
he
f
o
ion
is
div
The
a)
$.4
17
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
3.2 The politico-geographical position of Hungary within the Monarchy
The Austro—Hungarian Monarchy, created by the Compromise of 1867, was a
complex state formation comprehended differently by the political elite of the
contracting parties and sometime by their governments, too. The Hungarian politi-
cal elite was divided about the issue of the mission of the Monarchy, within that,
about the interests of Hungary. The "dispute of public law" continuously had a
significant influence on the Hungarian home policy.
In the 20th century, the inner political—territorial structures of the Monarchy were
made even more complicated by the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Hun-
garian leading political circles objected to the annexation, later demanded that once it
was done, the territory be annexed, by historical right, to the Hungarian Crown.
Hungary can only be considered as a political formation with a partial inde-
pendence, a limited sovereignty within the Monarchy. In foreign affairs, military
and security policy issues Hungary was not independent, however, it had a com-
plete autonomy as regarded home affairs.
The Act on the Compromise, taking the separate situation of Hungary into con-
sideration, talked of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia as parts of the Hungarian
Crown, but Dalmatia was under Austrian reign all through the dualist period.
(Within the Hungarian politico-geography, a separate school, the so-called
"geography of public law" was created for the geographical analysis of the Hun-
garian connections to Austria and for the study of the pending territorial issues.)
Both in the Hungarian politics and the Hungarian science, especially in the po-
litico-geography, a kind of conscious, proudly accepted and announced imperialis-
tic effort could be seen (Havass, R. 1902). This Hungarian imperialism, which was
seen as having a positive content at that time, saw the civilisation of the Balkans as
its primary mission.
In accordance with the official statistical definition of the time, the "Hungarian
Empire", after the Hungarian—Croatian compromise and the embourgeoisment of
the frontier region, consisted of Croatia—Slavonia as genuine associate countries,
the port of Fiume and its environs, as a separate body annexed to the Hungarian
Crown, and the Motherland. The Hungarian politico-geography treated Dalmatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina as "non-united associate states" (Loczy, L. ed. 1918).
The historical Hungary in itself was considerable by European standards with
its territory of 325 411 km 2. As an independent state, Hungary would have been the
6th biggest state in Europe. Considering its size and topographical position, it was
actually the historical Hungary that maintained the spatial unity of the Monarchy, as
it was larger in territory than the Austrian part without Bosnia-Herzegovina.
By population, Hungary with its 20.8 million inhabitants would have been the
7 th most populated country in Europe in 1910. The number of population was sig-
18
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
nificantly lower than in the Austrian territories, and the low population density (64
persons/km2) was especially striking. The real political problem was the heteroge-
neous ethnic composition of the population. The proportion of those with Hungar-
ian mother language did not reach 50% in the whole of the Hungarian Empire
(48.1%), and even in the Motherland in the narrower sense, the share of the Hun-
garians hardly exceeded 50% (54.5%). Only 57.4% of the population of the Hun-
garian Empire spoke Hungarian, thus the proportion of the population speaking
Hungarian was less than 10% more than the share of those with Hungarian as
mother tongue. In Croatia—Slavonia, despite the 900 years of common history of
the states, only 6.5% of the population spoke Hungarian. The number and share of
the ethnic minorities was more significant along the state borders, and for the ma-
jority of them, the attraction of the (Romanian, Serb) nation states on the other side
of the border was tempting. The centrifugal forces gradually strengthened in po-
litical sense, and these forces could only be counter-balanced by the centripetal
forces in the times of peace.
The major parts of the borders of the historical Hungary were so-called internal
borders, towards the Austrian territories. Hungary only had international, external
borders to Romania and Serbia, although the border to Serbia was at the same time
the border of the most delicate political conflicts of interest of the Monarchy.
Economically, Hungary was in a special situation within the Monarchy, be-
cause its territory was the richest part of the Monarchy in minerals, and its natural
resources were the most important. However, its economic performance, looking at
the real division of production, did not reach the weight and volume of the Aus-
trian territories, although the lagging behind of Hungary gradually decreased. Be-
cause of the belated development, several sectors of the Hungarian industry were
significantly more up to date than the industry in the Austrian territories. As re-
gards agriculture, Hungary became the Monarchy's granary, after the anti-
inundation works and the regulation of the rivers.
Politically, the representation of Hungary as whole was weak, as the dominant
factor of the politics was the weight of the ruler. Francis Joseph — who was the
Austrian emperor and the Hungarian king in one person — played a dominant role
in the formation of the policy, especially the foreign policy of the Monarchy, in
addition to the legal structures of the constitutional monarchy — or sometimes op-
posite to them.
As regards foreign policy, in certain periods of the dualism, the Hungarian in-
terests, then considered as of primary importance, were asserted. At the same time,
we have to know that the Hungarian prime minister (Istvan Tisza), who opposed to
the war (in a fear that the unfavourable outcome of the war would jeopardise the
unity of the country), could not prevent the declaration of war on Serbia. A signifi-
cant part of the Hungarian elite recognised that the interest of Hungary was the
maintenance of the status quo and not the questioning of that.
19
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
4 The situation of Hungary in the time of the transition after
World War I, 1918-1920
With the military defeat and the starting disintegration of the Monarchy, the his-
torical Hungary found itself in a new situation. The most important issues were
how Hungary was able to "come out" from the Monarchy, on the one hand, and the
collapse caused by the world war, on the other.
The civil democratic revolution of 1918 (the so-called "Daisy Revolution",
October 1918) declared the secession of Hungary from Austria, then the republic
was announced. The new leadership at the same time attempted to preserve the
territorial integrity of the historical Hungary. These efforts were unsuccessful:
among the ethnic minorities of the historical Hungary, the Croats were the first to
announce their secession from Hungary, followed by the Slovaks and then the
Romanians.
The acquisition of the independence and the restoration of the state sovereignty
began in an extremely tough situation, within very difficult conditions: war defeat,
lack of separate, independent foreign affairs and military affairs, the secession ef-
forts of the ethnic minorities, worsening relationships to the neighbouring coun-
tries and the winning European great powers, the opposition to the USA, the ob-
jective conflict between the Hungarian national goals and the 14 points declared
by the president of America.
Mihaly Karolyi, as the president of the new Republic of Hungary, tried to cre-
ate a new, entente-friendly foreign policy orientation from the autumn of 1918.
Karolyi had to experience that, apart from his own personal political contacts, the
new Hungary had no real contacts towards the winning great powers. The winning
great powers saw as their primary objective the restriction of the spatial connec-
tions and the role of Germany (after 1917, the Soviet-Russian threat was also occa-
sionally mentioned). In this objective, a range of the new successor states fitted
much more than perhaps the surviving historical Hungary.
The peace conference seating in Paris in January 1919 found an internally dis-
integrated Hungary, helpless in all respects and unable to assert its interests. Mi-
haly Karolyi did not wish to accept the memorandum containing the decisions of
the peace conference, which ordered the evacuation of the Hungarian territories
East to the Tisza river, he resigned instead.
After the Communist take-over in March 1919, the leaders of the Hungarian
Soviet Republic sought the strategic alliance of Soviet-Russia. This orientation
could not receive a broad support by the majority of the Hungarian society. The
political views, values and objectives of the Communist central power and those of
the majority of the society were essentially opposite to each other.
In spite of the temporary military achievements (the re-occupation of the major
part of Upper Northern Hungary), the events of the internal civil war, the invasion
20
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
of Hungary by different foreign powers (Czechs, Serbs, Romanians, French) in
August 1919 created a hopeless situation that left extremely strong marks in the
Hungarian public thinking. The most shocking experience was the marching in of
the Romanian troops into Budapest, and the Romanian invasion (Romsics I. ed.
1998).
The short period following the war raised a host of tasks and challenges (the
task of creating the independent state existence, decision on the basic issues of the
socio-economic arrangement, formation of the new foreign policy orientation), to
which the Hungarian society sought the solution in extremes, to a large extent be-
cause of the winning great powers and their allies in the neighbouring states, and
the communist effort of take-over and its failure.
The Horthy-system, shaping from the autumn of 1919 and then consolidating,
signed the Trianon peace treaty concluding World War I in the summer of 1920,
partly because of its own external legitimacy, but more importantly under the
weight of the external constraints and forces. In accordance with the peace treaty,
Hungary lost approximately two-thirds of its former territory and population (Fig-
ure 3, Table 1). The tragedy of the peace treaty was further exacerbated by the fact
that some one-third of the Hungarian ethnic population was now outside the new
Hungarian borders (Figure 4).
The peace treaty of Trianon created a state territory without historical prelimi-
naries and geographical bases. The new borders of Hungary did not coincide with
the previous border in a single point. Hungary became, from a basin-country, a
country in the bottom of a basin, and the living space of the Hungarian ethnic
population was divided according to the interests of the successor states.
Table 1
Disintegration of historical Hungary after the Trianon Peace Treaty
Country
Territory
Population
Number of
(km2)
(million)
Hungarians
(thousand)
Historical Hungary
325411
20.880
10,050
of which disannexed to
Austria
3972
0.290
26,000
Czechoslovakia
61578
3.510
1,064
Italy
21
0.049
6,000
Poland
589
0.023
0,200
Romania
103093
5.250
1,647
Yugoslavia
63085
4.130
453,000
Hungary of Trianon
93073
7.610
7,147
21
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
O
O
ti
Z
1)
ary
"Zr
l Hung
"0
. ""
0
ica
0
tor
0
his
0
0
t
he
f
crn
o
a)
ion
is
0
0
div
l
0
r
ia
0
0
ito
0
0
terr
The
•
g
0 I
‘6.1
t).0
•
' cL)
o
0
,
r
22
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
23
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
5 The changes of the politico-geographical position of Hungary in
the period between the two world wars
The Trianon Peace Treaty, the Sopron referendum and the minor territorial ex-
changes created a new Hungary, under international control and strict military su-
pervision. Hungary became one of the weakest states in the region. In the new
Europe and new neighbourhood environment, the new Hungary had to get used to
the military supervision, the insignificance in power, the helplessness and the con-
sequences coming from being a small state (Table 2).
Table 2
Hungary and neighboring countries, 1923
Country
Territory
Population
Population
Number of
(km2 )
(million)
density
Hungarians
(head/km 2)
(thousand)
Hungary
93010
8.5
92
7,147
Austria
83833
6.5
78
10,400
Czechoslovakia
14394
13.6
97
702,000
Romania
294967
16.2
55
1,481
Yugoslavia
248987
11.9
48
457,000
In the period between the two wars, the Hungarian society and politics were
filled with the awareness of the unfairness of the Trianon arrangements. The Hun-
garian society could not resign itself to the new structures. In the life of Hungary
between the two word wars, the morally declared and socially legitimized goal (the
territorial revision) and the foreign policy ordered to this goal were confronted
with the European power and neighbourhood realities. The states of the Little En-
tente (Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia) were each much stronger in
military respect than Hungary.
The aspects of the territorial revision in between the two world wars almost ex-
clusively determined the foreign policy of Hungary, including the relationship with
the great powers and the neighbourhood connections. In this period, the connec-
tions to the great powers and the neighbourhood connections were partly overlap-
ping, as both Germany and the Soviet Union became neighbour states to Hungary.
24
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
5.1 Relationships to the great powers
The rearrangements of the world economy and the world power in the period be-
tween the two world wars affected the situation and possibilities of Hungary in a
versatile and contradictory way. Despite the different attempts and efforts, it be-
came more and more obvious that the winners of World War I were not interested
(neither the big nor the small ones) in the peaceful revision of the forced and dic-
tated peace treaty. Hungary, if it wanted to achieve its stated objectives, almost
necessarily had to be on that side which questioned the European power and terri-
torial structures created in Paris.
In the international and European political system, the League of the Nations
had an important position, despite all of its problems. Hungary could only join af-
ter accepting the Trianon Peace Treaty, in September 1922, but did not become a
major actor in the organisation (in April 1939, Hungary quit the League). The
League of the Nations was seen as a negative creation by the contemporary Hun-
garian public opinion. This organisation was responsible for controlling the obser-
vance of the peace treaty, on the other hand, Hungary gradually got the possibility
to demand that the rights stated in the peace treaty and guaranteed for the Hungar-
ian minorities be kept by the successor states.
In the inter-war period, a new element in the political thinking and practice was
the organising role of the ideological "values": fascism in Italy, Stalinism in the
Soviet Union, national-socialism in Germany, besides the former ideological val-
ues, such as liberalism and conservatism in Great Britain, the USA and France.
The ideological interests and real politics many times conflicted in the relation-
ships of the great powers to each other.
The Hungarian relationships to Italy were mainly determined by the fact that It-
aly was the first great power to demand officially the review of the peace treaty
made in Paris, including the "just peace for Hungary". The support of the Italian
diplomacy allowed the referendum in Sopron, as a consequence of which Sopron
and its area were given back to Hungary (in December 1921). The Hungarian—
Italian connections became more and more versatile, which finally led to the
making of the friendship pact between the two countries in April 1927.
In March 1934, the Italian—Hungarian—Austrian agreement was signed, which
prescribed a preliminary consultation in issues of common interest. Also, the mu-
tual deepening of trading connections was supported. The making of this treaty
revealed a kind of fear of the expected efforts by Hitler's Germany. In April 1935,
Italy made a statement at the international forum which said that after the
remilitarization of Germany, Hungary too should have equal rights to arming. In
1936, the Italian—Hungarian—Austrian contracts were reinforced, which implied a
kind of hostility toward Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union then. Italy assisted
the Hungarian revisionist efforts first in 1938, then in 1940, with the 1st and 2nd
25
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
Vienna Awards, respectively. Wide layers of the Hungarian society felt sympathy
for Italy, which did not primarily mean sympathy for fascism, rather for the Italian
state for its support of the revisionist demands of Hungary.
The German—Hungarian connections were quite different in the two periods of
the inner development of Germany (the Weimar and the Hitlerian Germany). Ger-
many before 1933 was a significant partner mainly only in the field of economy,
without a major political weight and impact on the Hungarian efforts, while Ger-
many after 1933 was more and more a direct political and power factor for Hun-
gary. In the Hungarian historical thinking, attempts were made to have the "first
and last henchman" approaches believed simultaneously (Zsigmond, L. ed., 1966),
which could hardly be corrected even after several decades (Varga, J. 1991, 1992).
Germany's effect was especially strengthened by the Anschluss (November
1938), as it became a direct neighbour to Hungary, and would have put its whole
economic and military weight on Hungary, whatever foreign policy Hungary
would have pursued. Hungary was mesmerised by the success of the territorial re-
vision, however, it became more and more obvious that the Germans, given the
new situation and conditions of power, were not interested in the complete Hun-
garian revision and were only willing to support the Hungarian territorial demands
until the ethnic borders. (Hungary had a "historical" territorial claim towards Ger-
many, because of Burgenland, also, towards its other ally, Italy, because of the port
town of Fiume.)
Hungary joined the Anti-Comintern Pact in January 1939. (This act gave the
Hungarian foreign policy a clear ideological content.) The anti-Soviet attitude of
the leading Hungarian politicians was even stronger than the demand for the terri-
torial revision. (The Hungarian political leadership did not wish to gain territories
in collaboration with the Soviet Union.)
In March 1939, the Hungarian Army — with the approval of Germany — reoccu-
pied the Sub-Carpathians, and reached the historical borders of the country. How-
ever, this territorial enlargement could not be justified by ethnographic arguments.
The Hungarian foreign policy was surprised by the German—Soviet collabora-
tion in the division of Poland (September 1939). In the beginning of World War II,
it became clearer than ever for the Hungarian leading elite that the ideological ap-
proach and the great power policy do not necessarily follow the same principles.
Hungary did not have a direct military role in the conflict, however, it gave shelter
to the large number of Polish refugees arriving at the country.
In August 1940, the arbitration of Germany and Italy gave North Transylvania
back to Hungary. This territorial increase was one of the main elements that made
Hungary join the three-power pact, in which Germany, Italy and Japan delimited
their spheres of interest.
26
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
In the spring of 1941, Germany attacked Yugoslavia — partly moving through
the Hungarian territory —, then, after the formal elimination of Yugoslavia, Hun-
gary also took military actions in order to defend the Hungarian minorities.
In June, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. (The struggle between the two
great power neighbours of Hungary affected the whole of Europe, rearranging the
power relations.) The war brought about a new situation in Hungary in all aspects,
and the sphere of action of the Hungarian foreign policy became rather tight. Hun-
gary, referring to the bombing in Kassa (the now KoKice) — the circumstances of
which are still argued — joined the invasion against the Soviet Union. (The Soviet
Union considered the support of the territorial claims of Hungary in Transylvania,
provided Hungary did not declare war on the Soviet Union.) This way Hungary
became a directly involved party in a global and continental fight, on the outcome
of which it could not have any influence at all.
After 1941, Germany, with its invasions, practically surrounded Hungary, and
Hungary now was completely at the mercy of Germany in all respects. During the
war, the Hungarian economy was integrated in almost all respects into the frame-
works of the German war economy and the new German European order (Hunke,
H. et al. n. d.).
On 19 March 1944, Germany seized the Hungarian territory, and used the hu-
man and financial resources of Hungary for its own war purposes. Hungary was
thus not an independent state any more in the final phase of the war.
The relationship of Hungary and Great Britain was not overshadowed by his-
torical conflicts, and the Hungarian public opinion only blamed Great Britain in
the second place for the Trianon Peace Treaty. The relationship between the two
countries was defined by the interest conflict and the different opinions about the
Central European situation.
The negotiation between Germany and Great Britain in the autumn of 1938
considered Hungary inasmuch as the acceptance of the German territorial claims —
implicitly — meant that Great Britain did not consider the territorial claims of Hun-
gary against Czechoslovakia as a "tearing test", and an occasional revision would
not have conflicted with the English interests. Great Britain later recognized the
results of the Hungarian territorial revisions.
Pal Teleki's government was consciously trying after 1938 to decrease the
overweight of the Germans and maintain the connections to Great Britain. The at-
tack of Germany against Yugoslavia and the Hungarian collaboration only resulted
in the disconnection of the diplomatic relations on the part of Great Britain, de-
spite the threats of the declaration of war. It was the Hungarian declaration of war
on the Soviet Union and the attack against the country that made Great Britain de-
clare war on Hungary.
The Hungarian—French relationships were basically determined by the role of
France in the creation of the Trianon Peace Treaty. France could not get over the
27
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
web of its Central European efforts and illusions (as the dominant supporter of the
Little Entente, its main objective was the preservation of the status quo created by
the peace treaty), also, Hungary was unable to forget the shock of Trianon. In
1925, the two countries made a trade contract based on the principle of greatest
commercial allowance.
The French foreign policy consistently and consciously supported Czechoslo-
vakia, Yugoslavia and Romania against Hungary. The different French interests
concerning Hungary and Romania were reflected in the contracts made with the
two countries: France made a contract with Romania that contained obligation of
support and relieve, while "only" made a friendship and non-aggression pact with
Hungary (June 1926).
In the early 1930s, the French government made an attempt to develop the co-
operation of the Danubian states, but the French possibilities shrank to the mini-
mum after Hitler took over in Germany. France was rapidly pushed out of the re-
gion both economically and politically.
The relationship between the Soviet Union and Hungary was defined by the
transformations of the international political system, the ideological opposition,
the avowed anti-Sovietism of the Hungarian leaders and the internal policy of
Hungary. The Hungarian—Soviet relationship was heavily burdened by the histori-
cal experiences of the Hungarian elite in force about the communists, collected
during the period of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. The connections between the
two countries were determined by the anti-Communist attitude of the Hungarian
government in the whole period. Particular businesses were occasionally made
between Hungary and the Soviet Union (the issue and exchange of the communists
arrested in Hungary and the war prisoners kept in Soviet-Russia).
Hungary was reluctant to recognize the Soviet Union (September 1924), and
the complete settling of the diplomatic relations was prolonged, for home political
reasons. The Hungarian leading class was almost never able to conduct a real poli-
tics towards the Soviet Union.
After September 1939, along the former Hungarian—Polish border, the Soviet
Union became a neighbour state to Hungary. The neighbourhood relationship
raised the issue of making a trading contract between the two countries. The
agreement signed in 1940 settled the basic issues of the economic, transport etc.
relationship between the Soviet Union and Hungary.
The declaration of war on the Soviet Union was a historical mistake of Hun-
gary, a misjudgement of the interests and the power relations. In addition, this step
not only made Hungary an enemy of the Soviet Union but also that of Great Brit-
ain.
The development of the relationships between the USA and Hungary was pro-
moted by the fact that the Senate of the USA did not ratify the Trianon Peace
Treaty, instead, it made a separate peace treaty with Hungary in August 1921. The
28
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
public opinion of the USA recognized some injustices of the Trianon Peace Treaty.
In April 1924, the two countries made a friendship, trading and consular agree-
ment. The USA, because of its strengthening isolationism, could not become the
representative of the Hungarian interests.
The economic connections between the two countries were significant for Hun-
gary. In 1939, the USA had the 7th, in 1940 already the 3rd position in the import
of Hungary.
In December 1941, because of the mechanical constraints of the alliance rela-
tions, Hungary declared war on the USA, although there were no bilateral prob-
lems of any kind between the two countries. This declaration of war by Hungary
was a splendid example of a foreign political action that was irrational from the
aspect of the national interests and derived from the alliance connections.
During World War II, Hungary thus declared war on both of the future super
powers. The logic of Hungary's alliance connections with and alignments to the
axis powers resulted in such a historical mistake of roles and power relations
which Hungary was unable to solve after the war, in connection with either of the
super powers.
5.2 Neighbourhood connections
The beginning of the period was characterised by the complete isolation of Hun-
gary, partly because of the joint efforts of the Little Entente (after March 1921:
Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia), and partly because of the specific Bur-
genland-policy of Austria. In the field of bilateral connections, the first step for-
ward was made towards Austria, followed by Yugoslavia at the end of the inter-
war period. The Czechoslovakian—Hungarian and the Romanian—Hungarian rela-
tionships remained tense all through this historical era.
Starting in 1938, Hungary gradually eliminated the territorial structures created
in Trianon, with the support or recognition of the great powers. Hungary's neigh-
bourhood environment, politico-geographical position and sphere of action in for-
eign policy continuously changed, and its neighbourhood radically changed before
and during World War II (Figure 5). It is a tragedy and at the same time the irony
of this age that the enlarged Hungary was more and more pressed by the neigh-
bourhood, territory and power of Germany.
The Hungarian—Austrian connections had totally new political, economic and
territorial conditions after the rearrangements following World War I. The rela-
tionship between the two countries was burdened not only by the conflicts deriving
from the common historical past, but also the international settling of the borders
after the war. The majority of the population of Burgenland spoke German as
mother tongue, but this was the only place along the Hungarian borders where the
nationality boundaries were applied when drawing the state borders.
29
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
7
194
1938-
ary,
Hung
f
o
itory
terr
t
he
f
o
es
hang
c
he
T
30
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
As a result of the complicated situation that emerged in the area (the Hungarian
aristocracy and the nationalists wanted to create an independent state called Lajta
Banate), the acquisition of the territory became problematic. The Czechoslovakian
and the Serbian government promised an armed support to Austria for the occupa-
tion of West Hungary, which it did not wish to use.
In December 1921, at the Sopron referendum, Sopron and its environment de-
cided upon belonging to Hungary. The political connections of the two countries
gradually improved. A kind of conscience of interdependence appeared in the two,
now small, states. This was important especially for Hungary, since Austria was
the only free access to Europe for Hungary.
In January 1931, the Hungarian—Austrian friendship pact was signed. The con-
nections of the two countries were gradually integrated into the triple alliance
made with the Italians. The triple collaboration could not stop Germany's efforts to
annex Austria.
The relationship of Hungary and Czechoslovakia was defined by an opposition
in the whole of the inter-war period. The situation of the Hungarian minority — al-
though it was the best among the successor states — and the declared territorial de-
mands of Hungary almost paralysed the inter-state connections.
The Munich Pact, signed by four powers in September 1938 (Great Britain,
France, Germany and Italy), decided that the Hungarian—Czechoslovakian issue be
settled bilaterally, allowing a three-month period for the two parties to come to an
agreement. In October, the negotiations between the two parties started, but they
could not agree upon the line of the common border. With the 1st Vienna Award,
Hungary reached its goals, with the exception of the towns of Pozsony (the now
Bratislava) and Nyitra (the now Nitra).
The Slovaks first declared their autonomy on 6. October 1938, then also their
secession from the Czechs on 14. March 1939. Carpathian Ukraine declared its
independence on 14. March, too. With these internal decisions, Czechoslovakia,
created in Trianon, ceased to exist as regarded international law.
The relationship of Hungary to the new Slovakia was basically not better than
the relationships had been between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In Slovakia (its
territory was 38 116 km 2, its population 2.6 million people), the number of the
Hungarian minority decreased to a large extent, some 100 000 Hungarian ethnic
population remained as fragments in the territory of the new country. In the spring
of 1939, Slovakia made a 25-year military contract with Germany, in which Ger-
many accepted to protect the new borders and represent the foreign political inter-
ests of Slovakia. Slovakia in reality functioned as a puppet state of Germany. In
the formation of its inner structures it followed the example of Germany.
When in March 1939 Hungary invaded the territory of Sub-Carpathia with a
unilateral military action, this action almost led to a war between Hungary and
Slovakia. On 24. March 1939, Slovak planes bombed the town of Ungvar that now
31
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
belonged to Hungary. The two countries, on German pressure, ended the open
hostility, and agreed on the exact state borders in April.
The relationship of Hungary to Romania was determined by the fact that Ro-
mania received the largest territory and population in the Trianon Peace Treaty,
and the largest number of Hungarian ethnic minority, partly living in one single
block, was also there.
In territory, Romania was almost three times bigger than Hungary after Tri-
anon, also, its population and economic performance significantly exceeded that of
Hungary. In military respect, Romania had an overwhelming advantage over Hun-
gary. Romania actually became a regional middle power in the period between the
two world wars.
The Hungarian—Romanian economic connections were defined by the political
relations. The Hungarian import exceeded the export all the time. The Hungarian
export to Romania showed the features of a developed country.
In August 1940, Hungary defined its open territorial claims against Romania in
a memorandum. The bilateral negotiations did not bring any result. Romania asked
for arbitration, and the 2nd Vienna Award gave North Transylvania back to Hun-
gary. This decision did not solve the connections of the two countries, in fact, it
made them even more complicated in many respects, and both of them were more
and more looking for the favour of Germany.
The relationship between Hungary and Yugoslavia was almost always tense
between the two world wars, deriving from the consequences of the breaking out
of World War I and the tensions of the ethnic minority issues. Hungary now was a
terrestrial country, without any seacoast, and its access to the seas was under
Yugoslav control both on the Danube river and towards the Adriatic Sea. (Rijeka
belonged to Italy after 1924.)
In 1934, the assassination of King Alexander in Marseilles made the relation-
ship between the two countries even tenser, as Yugoslavia accused Hungary of
supporting the Croatian assassins.
Italy made attempts from 1939 to alleviate the Hungarian—Yugoslav problems
and to settle the relationship between the two states. In December 1940, the Hun-
garian—Yugoslav friendship pact was signed. The pact offered a basis for new re-
lationships for the two countries, carrying the possibilities of the long-term recon-
ciliation. The pact was compatible with both the current German and Italian inter-
ests.
After the inner turn in Yugoslavia in 1941, the relationship between Hungary
and Yugoslavia became tense again. After the making of the Soviet—Yugoslav
friendship pact, Yugoslavia became the enemy of Hungary again. A part of the
German troops marched through Hungary against Yugoslavia. Hungary only inter-
fered later, after the former elimination of the Trianon-made Yugoslavia, and
seized a part of its historical territories.
32
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
Croatia declared its independence on 10. April 1941, legally eliminating this
way the Yugoslavia made in Trianon. Croatia then had a territory of 125 000 km 2
and a population of 7 million people. It was not the historical territory of the
country, but a much larger area, integrating Bosnia-Herzegovina, too.
The ethnic and religious composition of the country was extremely versatile, at
the same time, the Hungarian—Croatian relationship was not burdened by ethnic
minority problems, because only a limited number of ethnic minorities lived in
both countries.
After 1933 — especially following 1938 —, the neighbourhood connections were
mostly shaped by (the relationship to) Germany in the region of Hungary. The
small states were competing against each other and were used against one another
to some extent, at the same time, they tried to exceed each other in meeting the
demands of Germany. This way they were practically enemies to one another,
however, their connections to Germany made them allies. This situation is per-
fectly reflected by the saying of the time which depicted these circumstances as the
"misery of the small states".
33
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
6 The dilemma of the loser Hungary and the victorious great
powers, 1944-1948
In March 1944, Germany invaded Hungary. Although the head of state could keep
his position, Horthy's possibilities to influence the political processes were rather
limited. The Hungarian government in reality only executed the demands of the
Germans, the real sovereignty of Hungary ceased to exist.
In 1944, Hungary became a buffer zone in the fights of the world powers and
the European powers, the fronts of the battles remained in the territory of Hungary
for months. After September 1944, the present territory of Hungary was divided
between the areas of German occupation and the Soviet "liberation". The zone of
the Soviet influence gradually grew the territories under the control of the Ger-
mans and the allied Hungarian forces shrank day after day.
The turn of 1944 and 1945 was one of the most tragic times in the history of the
divided Hungary (divided by territorial, power and ideological respects). Such a
confusion of (partly legitimised) values and the denial of the same values were
present in Hungary that had never been experienced in the previous history of the
country.
The attempts of Hungary to "jump out" were all unsuccessful, so the country
found itself among the losers at the end of the war, which was a negative fact in
the eyes of all the dominant international actors in the given period of time.
In December 1944, the Contemporary National Assembly was founded in the
territory occupied by the Soviet Union, them the Contemporary National Govern-
ment was created, too. This government declared war on the fascist Germany and
in January 1945 it made a cease-fire agreement with the Soviet Union and the Al-
lied Powers.
The agreement was actually the ratification of a limited sovereignty, and the
Allied Control Commission was founded for the implementation and supervision
of the lines of the agreement. (This body operated until September 1947, the depo-
sition of the peace treaty of Paris.) The cease-fire agreement also contained that
the state borders as of 31 December 1937 were considered as standard (Balogh, S.
1988).
In the conference held at Yalta in February 1945, the "Yalta world order" was
created. It basically determined the long-term frameworks of the development and
the possibilities of the politico-geographical position of Europe, including Hun-
gary. The bases of the potential division of Europe were laid down in Yalta, al-
though not put down in international contracts, only in informal, verbal agree-
ments, which, however, were respected by all parties for a long while.
By April 1945, the whole territory of Hungary was under a Soviet occupation.
Publicly the Soviet Union consistently stated that it did not want to interfere into
the internal socio-economic order of Hungary, but the presence of the Red Army,
34
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
the Soviet leadership and dominance of the Allied Control Commission in them-
selves basically influenced the inner development of Hungary, including the
sphere of action of the Hungarian foreign policy.
The British and American concepts of the creation of new states by the division
of Germany (e.g. the South German State with Vienna as the capital city, which
would have involved Bavaria, Baden, Wurtemberg, Austria and Hungary) failed
(Romsics, I. 1998). The Soviet Union had no interest in the creation of state for-
mations that it was unable to influence. Also, in the territories occupied by the So-
viet Union, the different attempts of federation — which were stated with different
objectives and according to different political values —, were not supported by the
Soviet Union (Gyarmati, Gy. 1992).
During the preparation of the peace treaty to be made with Romania, in con-
nection with Hungary a debate around Transylvania happened among the winners
after September 1945. All the interested parties were under the influence of the
experiences collected before and during the war. The USA were more willing to
accept some correction of the borders drawn at Trianon (although it would not ac-
cept completely the 2nd Vienna Award), but finally the opinion of the Soviet Un-
ion was given priority and the whole of Transylvania remained within the borders
of Romania.
In Hungary, there were significant political powers interested in the creation of
the "last henchman" image. This image served the political and historical defaming
of the inner bourgeois forces, and the manipulation of the foreign relations and the
external image of Hungary. This label became an element in the negative self-
image of a part of the Hungarian society, contributing to the inner moral decay of
the Hungarian society.
The parliamentary elections held in November 1945 were won with an over-
whelming majority (57%) by the Smallholders Party that also included bourgeois
powers, but the party was unable to realise its political victory achieved at the
elections in either the home or the foreign policy of the coalition government. The
situation following the elections well demonstrated the narrow sphere of action of
the inner forces when their efforts did not fir clearly into the Soviet concepts.
During the preparation of the peace and the settling of the relationships with the
neighbouring countries, it soon became clear that there was no winning great
power with a dominant interest in Hungary, which would have made them defend
under all circumstances the interests of Hungary. The loser country, Hungary did
not receive any support from the great powers for the assertion of its interests.
Churchill's speech held at Fulton (5 March 1946) "anticipated" in a sense the
forthcoming processes, but the speech might have also included "between the
lines" that Churchill could clearly see the consequences of his dealings with Stalin
about the interest zones in Central and Southeast Europe. The anticipations stated
in the speech were soon justified by the history of the era and the region.
35
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
As opposed to the neighbouring countries recognized as winners (Yugoslavia
and Czechoslovakia), and partly the sooner "escaped" state (Romania) and the one
that was treated specially, because it was considered as the first victim (Austria),
Hungary had weak positions of negotiation. By the acquisition of Sub-Carpathia,
the Soviet Union became a direct neighbour to Hungary. There was practically no
basis for Hungary to asserts its interests against the neighbours. In many respects,
Hungary was in a subordinate position compared to its neighbours, mostly because
of the Soviet Union.
The relationships between Hungary and the neighbouring states were heavily
burdened by the home political efforts of some countries. In their Kogice pro-
gramme announced in April 1945, the Czechoslovakian government made the
Hungarian minority responsible for the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. The
Hungarian ethnic minority was deprived of practically all their rights. The mass
executions and revenges in Yugoslavia in 1944-1945 took some 40,000 Hungarian
victims, the massacres of the Hungarians in Romania did not demand so many
dead.
The evacuations (of Germans) from Hungary, the formally bilateral (Hungar-
ian—Czechoslovakian) evacuations of Hungarians from Slovakia, which were set-
tled in agreement but in practice were mostly unilateral, made the relationship
between the population of the countries go wrong in many respects. Such bad im-
ages of the neighbours emerged in the societies that made it very hard to create
bilateral connections in the future.
It became very important in the economic connections that the Soviet Union
acquired the former German properties, also, the completion of the compensations
made the role of the Soviet Union dominant in many respects. In 1946, the Soviet
Union achieved a key position in several strategic sectors of the Hungarian econ-
omy. The Soviet Union became one of the strongest internal and external actors in
the Hungarian economy at the same time.
The Hungarian preparation of the peace took place within unfavourable cir-
cumstances, both with the respect to the home and foreign policy. The demands
stated by certain parties and persons for border alterations based on ethnic grounds
divided the Hungarian home political life, on the one hand, and burdened the rela-
tionships to the neighbour states, on the other. Nobody had any doubt that against
the Soviet Union, Hungary would be unable to have the ethnically based border-
lines realised at the peace talks.
On 10 February 1947, Hungary finally signed a "usual" peace treaty of the de-
feated states in Paris, which further decreased the territory of Hungary with the
Pozsony (now Bratislava) bridgehead. The peace treaty complied with the needs of
the great powers and satisfied most of the demands of the neighbouring states. For
securing the tasks connected to the occupation of Austria, the Soviet Union could
station troops in Hungary.
36
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
The Truman doctrine announced in March 1947 on the enclosure of the Soviet
Union and the stopping of world communism, opposite to its intentions, acceler-
ated the formation of the Hungarian dependence on the Soviet Union. The occa-
sional uncertainties of the Soviet concepts about the status of Hungary were re-
placed by efforts aiming at the achievement of a clear alignment.
During the debate on foreign policy in the Parliament in March 1947, the Hun-
garian political parties turned out to be basically divided about the issue of the ori-
entation of the foreign policy. The majority felt that the world political ambitions
of the Soviet Union and the western powers were "above us" and Hungary had no
real chance to influence these processes. In the new world political situation, the
"bridge role", i.e. that Hungary should be a kind of intermediary between the
"East" and the "West", was stated parallel to the need for the declaration and en-
actment of the "eternal neutrality" of Hungary, while the left-wing parties wanted
to deepen the relationship to the Soviet Union.
At the announcement of the Marshal Plan in June 1947, Hungary was not in a
situation either from home or foreign political aspects to accept the American as-
sistance. Behind the decision, the integration of the foreign political efforts and the
economic connections could be seen as clearly as never before.
In the autumn of 1947, the theory of the two world systems was stated in the
Soviet Union (Zdanew-doctrine), which modelled the division of the world in all
respects. Zdanew defined the USA as the lead power of the "imperialist camp",
while as the leader of the "socialist peace camp", the Soviet Union. In Zdanew's
view, in this situation of the world politics, each state had to choose which camp to
join. For Hungary, the possibilities of the "choice" were limited by the Soviet oc-
cupation.
With signing the friendship, collaboration and mutual assistance pact with
Yugoslavia (December 1947), the all-embracing settlement of the relationships to
the neighbouring countries started. The Hungarian—Yugoslav connections were the
fastest developing among the neighbouring countries of Hungary, in fact, it was
felt by many sometimes that the Yugoslav connections were a kind of alternative
against the Soviet Union.
The friendship, collaboration and mutual assistance pact made with Romania
(January 1948) and the Soviet Union (February 1948) settled the "orientation de-
bate" in the field of foreign policy. Hungary had made contracts with its dominant
neighbours, which contained clear spatial and social alignments.
By the summer of 1948, the internal political struggle had come to an end. The
left-wing parties, especially the Hungarian Communist Party, enjoying the support
of the Soviet Union, received key positions in all respects, and the later created
Hungarian Workers' Party had essentially a monopoly of power, by which it de-
termined the further development of the country.
37
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
From the summer of 1948, the connection between the Soviet Union and Yugo-
slavia gradually became tense, which was immediately reflected, almost as a mir-
ror image, by the deterioration the Hungarian—Yugoslav bilateral connections. It
became evident that the Soviet Union dominated the foreign policy of the allied
smaller states and defined their sphere of action. Along the Hungarian—Yugoslav
border, a war psychosis could be felt for years, with a large number of minor bor-
der incidents.
38
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
7 In the alliance system of the Soviet Union, 1949-1991
The whole of this period of time, its essential processes and turning points were
determined by the relationship between the USA and the Soviet Union. In this di-
vided situation of the world power and the competition of the super powers, Hun-
gary was only in the foreground during the revolution of 1956. The "harmonised
foreign policy" of the socialist countries always articulated primarily the purposes
and interests of the Soviet Union, the sphere of action of the small states was
strongly reduced, although it did not cease to exist. From the late 1960s, Hungary
— driven by its real national interests — was a factor relieving the tension between
the world systems, later it became something like an intermediary.
After the political turn in 1948, the politico-geographical position of Hungary
was basically determined by the belonging to the socialist alliance system. The
state borders (2 246 kms altogether) mostly connected Hungary to socialist coun-
tries (84.1%), within that, 56.9% were "alliance, military integration borders" after
1955. Only 15.9% of the length of the Hungarian state borders joined Hungary to
Austria, whose border regions along Hungary had been occupied by the Soviets
before the signing of the Austrian political treaty (1955), then Austria became
neutral. By the temporary values, such a politico-geographical position of the
country was seen as favourable.
The politico-geographical position of most states in Central Europe was inter-
nationally determined in most aspects, but the given countries had particular and
individual features, too (Enyedi, Gy. 1978). These features partly came from their
different historical development, and partly from the ambitions of the current po-
litical leadership.
7.1 The building out and questioning of the socialist alliance system,
1949-1956
In the classical period of the cold war, the relationship between the two alliance
systems was defined by an open opposition. Both in Europe (1949 NATO, Ger-
many) and in the Asian region (China, Korea), the relationship between the two
great powers sharpened, and their different intentions were openly revealed.
After the world political processes and the internal turn, Hungary was organi-
cally built into the power and economic structure of the Soviet Union, it became
part of the "socialist camp". It is worth noting that in 1949, it was the economic
relationships that were laid down in an international treaty and organised into an
international body: the COMECON was born (20. January 1949), as an organisa-
tion for the economic co-operation of the socialist countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslo-
vakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania and the Soviet Union).
39
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
The Hungarian—western (especially the ,Hungarian—American) connections
were defined by the negative consequences deriving from the opposition of the two
world systems. This was true both for the economic (political trials, expropria-
tions) and the political connections (the closure of both Hungarian consulates by
the American party).
As a result of the multilateral compromise made by the great powers, Hungary
became member of the UN in December 1955. The membership in the given pe-
riod of time only meant that Hungary could fulfil its socialist alignments to the
socialist camp at this forum, too. Later the membership offered a broader possibil-
ity to join the international processes.
The Soviet economic, social, institutional etc. system was copied in Hungary to
almost 100%. In almost all sectors of the Hungarian economy, Soviet advisors ap-
peared, and the security—military structures of the country were re-built after the
Soviet example, led by the Soviet advisors. The Hungarian—Soviet economic con-
nections rapidly developed, and the Hungarian economy was in almost all respects
linked to the bilateral connections.
The COMECON set autarchy as an objective at the level of the organisation, as
the preparation for World War III was an everyday topic. In addition, the strive for
internal autarchy appeared in almost all of the small socialist states. The prepara-
tion for the war led to such structural distortions, which determined the whole pe-
riod of the state socialism.
Compared to the opposition of the two world systems, in most of the period the
neighbour state connections — with the exception of the Soviet Union, of course —
were of secondary importance.
• Among the socialist neighbour states, Czechoslovakia was the last with
whom Hungary settled the relationships. The two countries signed the
friendship, collaboration and mutual assistance pact in April 1949. (The two
countries had joined the COMECON before the relationship between each
other was settled.) This meant that the "alliance connection" was practically
void of any content in the case of the smaller states, only the relationship to
the Soviet Union had significance "within the camp".
• Romania made spectacular steps for the improvement of the situation of the
Hungarian ethnic minority, thus the connection between the two countries
developed better in this period (compared to the other states). The Hungarian
minority was not a separating factor in the relationship between the two
states yet.
• The development of the Hungarian—Yugoslav connections was astonishing in
the first half of the 1950s. Along the border between the two countries, mi-
nor military conflicts were everyday affairs, and fortification works never
seen before were implemented on both sides, especially in Hungary.
40
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
• The regions of Austria bordering Hungary were under Soviet occupation un-
til 1955, but the role of the invading power in home affairs was much more
limited. The control of the Austrian border was extremely strict on the Hun-
garian side. A system of technical object was established, which made the
"iron curtain" until 1989.
The complete dependence on the Soviet Union, the sovietisation of the Hun-
garian society, the mass appearance of externals alien to the Hungarians, the
problems of provision after the deformation of the economic structure, the omni-
presence of the personality cult and the deterioration of the public feeling first ap-
peared in the internal socio—economic—political crisis in 1953.
The signing of the Warsaw Treaty in 1955 cannot be separated from the Aus-
trian political treaty, as the evacuation of the Soviet troops from Austria eliminated
the legal grounds of their presence in Hungary, written down in the Paris peace
treaty. A new legitimacy was needed for the Hungarian stay of the Soviet troops.
The foundation of the COMECON and the signing of the Warsaw Treaty cre-
ated the institutional system that determined the intra-regional processes for dec-
ades (Figure 6). Hungary became part of the socialist camp, and within that, the
Soviet Union dominated the connections of Hungary.
Although the correction of the crimes and mistakes committed during the
building of the Socialism started in Hungary, it was a rather ambiguous process.
From the summer of 1956 on, a significant part of the Hungarian society turned
against the created structures, the former practice and the unlimited and one-sided
dependence on the Soviet Union.
The Hungarian revolution in October 1956 carried in almost all respects the
consequences of the subtle development and new interests of the Hungarian soci-
ety after 1945. The major part of the Hungarian society supported the values of the
revolution, at the same time, there were societal forces interested in the conserva-
tion of the status quo.
As regards the foreign political orientation of Hungary, the most important
elements were the declaration of the secession from the Warsaw Treaty and of
neutrality. The majority of the Hungarian society supported the new foreign politi-
cal guidelines, but besides the declarations there was no power or possibility for
the assertion of the decisions of the society.
The short-armed fight for independence that emerged from the revolution, the
struggle of the Hungarian troops against the Soviet Union was hopeless from
military aspects, but its political and moral content, and its message had a long-
term effect both in space and time. The Hungarian society had to experience that
the "West" remained inactive, all the support that the revolution got was nice talks,
encouragement and humanitarian aids — the free world did not break "rules of the
Yalta game".
41
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
,
A
40'44
/
4
4/ V
1 •
4
4‘
t' /
4
1
\
4
1955
e,
4
<
•
4
t"
44s
1
'
4
,
..s
,
s
d Europ
‘
JP
s +
4
JillidirLf
i
de
/
'aIIIIIIIIM
s
div
j
cillii .
he
T
0,-.-#1 `1"I's
-11.
\ 4EfiL .
atrk
.1
iihrogi
►
•,LOCICIel
ri
/131:11:101:11:11.
. 't 74-
iaLloopoor
ibociudODP-1-,acionock.. 40000000
ICIDODOCIDOODOCIDOCIDI i` 71:1 MCICIr
ji rp-qpoompoociamoomo monor
asqes
s
essisp-19a ‘118 B EL
macionor
mama"
--
3ricirirr-r -
41-7rwr
42
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
7.2 The interaction of the home and foreign policy (Hungary as the "most
cheerful barrack" of the socialist camp)
The creation and maintenance of the "most cheerful barrack" image carried both
foreign and home political elements and determinations. As regards home policy, it
implied that the power sought a kind of compromise with the majority of the soci-
ety, and as for foreign policy, it meant that the after 1956 the Hungarian leadership
tried to alleviate and not aggravate the international conflicts during most of the
period.
After the Soviet intervention in November 1956, such a social aversion against
the Soviet Union was born which determined for a long time the anti-Soviet feel-
ings of the majority of the Hungarian society (although this could not be openly
declared). At the same time, the internal political—power consolidation cannot be
understood without the disappointment which was triggered by the participation of
the "West" in 1956, and the negative evaluation of that.
The keeping of the "Hungarian issue" before the public eye in the UN did not
mean a real external pressure on the open and rough dictatorship in 1957-1958.
The dictatorship gradually became softer after the physical and legal showdowns.
This kind of consolidation of the inner system created the possibilities for the ac-
ceptance of the system signed with the name of Janos Kadar by the West.
From the 1960s, the formerly eliminated or frozen inter-state connections with
the capitalist states of Europe (France, Great Britain) were gradually settled. After
1964, the settling and re-definition of the Hungarian—Austrian relationships accel-
erated.
From the mid-1960s, a kind of internal acceptance of the socialist system was
basically achieved. Following the economic reform attempts of 1968, the interna-
tional recognition of the processes taking place in Hungary basically changed.
These Hungarian processes were seen more and more positively in the West and
with more and more reservations in the "East". The Hungarian political leadership
continuously had to "make excuses" for the inner economic reforms, however, in
matters of foreign policy, they stuck to the "common directives".
The Hungarian participation in the military intervention in Czechoslovakia in
1968 worsened the developing bilateral connections with the Western countries.
With the support of the intervention, Hungary tried to save its own internal re-
forms, but in reality it did not improve the evaluation of the Hungarian reforms
"within the camp".
The Hungarian—Romanian connections were influenced by the political favour
done for Janos Kadar (the detention of Imre Nagy and his companions in Roma-
nia). The tensions gradually emerged between the two countries. The individual
politics of Romania (towards China, Czechoslovakia and the USA) influenced the
43
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
relationship less than the gradual worsening of the situation of the Hungarian mi-
nority living in Transylvania. The turns of the Romanian home policy sometimes
created significant tensions in the connection between the two states.
Within the relationships to the neighbours, the Hungarian—Austrian connections
became more and more specific. Both parties were able and wanted to demonstrate
the political advantages of the policy of peaceful co-existence of the different so-
cio-economic systems. The improvement of the connections were also helped by
the fact that Hungary gradually became a small socialist state with the most ac-
ceptable internal circumstances.
When the Soviet—American connections grew colder, Hungary obtained a kind
of intermediary role in the East—West relationships. Hungary had a vested interest
in the easing of the tensions and the process of the extension and deepening of the
European security and co-operation. The economic, financial and political connec-
tions of Hungary gradually opened up towards the western countries.
In 1973, the Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister made an official visit to the
USA, which was meant to demonstrate that, the settlement of the Hungarian-
Ametican relationships started after 1956. (One prerequisite for this was the
release of Rizsef Mindszenty, archbishop of Esztergom.) The Hungarian—
American connections were settled in almost all respects with the return of the
Holy Crown in 1978 and the closing of the debates connected to the right of
property. The ups and downs of the Soviet—American connection had a negative
effect on the Hungarian—American connections, too, but these were no more
"mirror translations" of the former.
The relationship with the socialist countries was particularly demonstrated by
the "socialist passport" introduced in 1972. The red passport was valid for five
years, but only with a separate, special permission to Yugoslavia (by Hungarian
will) and the Soviet Union (by Soviet consideration). The introduction of the pass-
port meant for the majority of the Hungarian citizens that a part of the socialist
camp opened up for them. (Before 1972, the possibilities of individual travels to
the socialist countries were rather limited. In the socialist "camp", it was an alli-
ance based on inter-state connections and not on the ones between the societies.)
Induced by the energy crisis of 1973, a Yugoslav—Hungarian—Czechoslovakian
agreement was made in 1974 on the construction and joint use of the Adriatic pe-
troleum pipeline. In the given situation, the construction of the pipeline was mostly
an economic measure, but it also suggested the possibility of the decrease of the
dependence on the Soviet energy in the future.
The process of easing and the strives for the collective security of Europe were
compatible with the Hungarian interest in all respects. The acceptance of the Hel-
sinki Proclamation created favourable possibilities for the expansion of the sphere
of action of Hungarian foreign policy. (It is interesting that the Helsinki agreement
further aggravated the inter-state and inter-party connections with Romania. The
44
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
Romanian leadership — probably because of the worsening inner economic diffi-
culties — consciously misunderstood and misinterpreted Janos Kadar's speech held
at Helsinki.)
The intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1979 made it even
clearer — although it could not be a secret for the leaders of the smaller socialist
states before, either — that the leaders of the Soviet Union acted primarily in accor-
dance with their own geopolitical purposes and values, and paid but little attention
to the short and longer term interests of its own allies. The bilateral worsening of
the Soviet—American relationship and its negative economic effects were mostly
suffered by the smaller socialist countries.
Within the alliance system, Hungary was tied to the Soviet Union by a thousand
links. These links started to develop in different ways in different fields in the
1980s. There were minor disturbances in the political co-operation every now and
then, debates already occurred in the economic relationships, mostly triggered by a
stronger defence of the national interest of Hungary; at the same time, the firm
military connections were almost considered as a taboo.
The role of the Soviet Union was dominant even in the political connections
within the socialist alliance system, also, the Soviet Union dominated the relation-
ship of the individual states to it. In the Hungarian—Soviet political connections
there were no sharp conflicts which appeared to the public, only minor tensions
and frictions occurred occasionally. These tensions were partly in connection with
the different evaluations of the Hungarian economic reform steps and partly with
the Hungarian demands for the increase of the supply of oil.
The Hungarian state and party leadership did not criticise publicly the political
practice of the Soviet Union, but there were quite a few hard negotiations between
Leonid Bresnew and Janos Kadar. After 1985, with the election of Mikhail Gor-
bachew as secretary-general of the party, the former Hungarian reforms were more
positively evaluated, however, there were reservations on the Hungarian side con-
cerning the reforms of Gorbachew.
The relationship of Hungary to the neighbouring socialist states was not free
from conflicts in the 1980s, in fact, the relationship was rather tense with Roma-
nia, mostly because of the rapidly worsening situation of the Hungarian minority.
In the case of the connections to Czechoslovakia, it had ups and downs, primarily
because of the debates about the construction of the Danubian river barrage system
and the development of the situation of the Hungarian minority.
In the Hungarian—Yugoslavia connections — compared to the previous decades
— a relative consolidation was dominant. Yugoslavia was engaged with solving its
inner problems, struggling with the difficulties and contradictions of the transition
in the post-Tito era.
The Hungarian economy organically integrated into the division of labour of
the COMECON, and especially of the Soviet Union. The socialist economic
45
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
"commitment" gradually decreased, partly by the assertion of the national interests
and partly the gradual joining to the western world economy.
The basic structure of the Hungarian foreign trade in 1985, measured with the
total value of the turnover, was the following: the proportion of the socialist coun-
tries, within that the COMECON countries, was dominant both in import (54.4%)
and export (58.6%); the share of the developed capitalist countries was significant:
38.5% and 30.8%, respectively; the third world countries only accounted for 7.1%
of the Hungarian import and 10.6% of the export.
The most important foreign trade partner of Hungary was the Soviet Union,
with a 30% share from import and 33.6% from export. This weight of the Soviet
Union in the Hungarian foreign trade was based on both economic and political—
ideological grounds. Hungary's second most important foreign trade partner was
the Federal Republic of Germany, with an 11.4% share from import and 7.8%
from export.
In the second half of the 1980s, the development of the cross-border connec-
tions appeared as a new element along the western and southwestern borders of
Hungary. The counties along the western borders of Hungary gradually joined in
the activity of the Alpine—Adriatic Working Community (first as observers, then as
members). It is worth noting especially when we consider that Hungary was unable
to develop cross-border connections with its socialist allies. Across the Hungar-
ian—Soviet border, apart from the huge material flows of the foreign trade, there
were no regional and social connections. On the Soviet side of the Hungarian—So-
viet border, a kind of "socialist iron curtain" existed during the whole period.
In 1989, the "non-rouble account" turnover was already dominant in the Hun-
garian import (61.6%), parallel to the sharp decline of the rouble-account turnover
(38.4%). In export, a similar "account rearrangement" took place, 62.2% of the
total export was already non-rouble account. (Among the socialist states, the non-
rouble account trade increased, although rouble account was still prevalent this
year. The non-rouble account import from the Soviet Union amounted to 34 mil-
lion USD, that of the Hungarian export 239 million USD. As the secretary-general
of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Karoly Grosz almost demanded the
shift to the complete dollar-account trade and the overall use of the world market
prices.)
Looking at the breakdown of the import by countries, the COMECON countries
amounted to 36.9% in 1989, EEC countries to 29% and the EFTA countries to
13.8%, leaving little for the rest of the world (17.6%). The breakdown of the ex-
port by countries was slightly different (COMECON: 41.8%, EEC: 24.8%, EFTA:
10.7%, rest: 22.7%). In the rouble-account trade, the proportion of the Soviet Un-
ion was still prevalent in 1989. By territorial structure, the Hungarian foreign trade
was mostly neighbour-oriented —especially because of the Soviet Union — and thus
naturally Europe-oriented.
46
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
As regards military structures, Hungary was fully integrated into the organisa-
tion of the Warsaw Treaty, in reality the military doctrine of the Soviet Union, and
thus was subordinate to the Soviet Union. The Hungarian army was dependent
upon the Soviet Union in all respects (technical supply, plan of operations etc.).
The military political situation of Hungary was basically determined by its
place in the regional structure and "enemy image" of the Warsaw Treaty, and by
the Soviet geo-strategy. Within the alliance system, Hungary was considered as a
southwestern European state by its strategic position. At the same time, from this
aspect Hungary was not in the main front of the opposition between the two world
systems, it was a "battlefield of secondary importance". (When the Russian troops
left Hungary, they turned out to have accumulated such an amount of war tech-
nique, which showed that they had prepared for significant actions.)
The stationing of the Southern Soviet Army in Hungary did not only mean an
external oppression but also an internal one in some cases. The regional distribu-
tion of the Soviet military objects (Figure 7) clearly indicates that they prepared
for an attack towards the West on the one hand (external application), on the other
hand, the allocation of the Soviet ring around Budapest was very important (po-
tential application for internal oppression).
The Hungarian army was bigger in the number of troops but weaker in gun
power than the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. The weakness and outdated
technical level of the Hungarian air force was especially striking compared to the
Soviet air force stationed here. This structure indicates the potential helplessness
of the country and the Hungarian army.
The military connections remained stable until the moment of the systemic
change. In January 1988, the "Friendship 88" military exercises were organised,
with the participation of Hungarian, Czechoslovakian and Soviet divisions. In ac-
cordance with the new European political, safety and military policy agreements,
western observers were watching the manoeuvres all the time. In October 1988,
the Military Council of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Member States
was seating in Budapest, and they looked at the possible consequences of the de-
crease in the military force. Following the counselling session — with the partici-
pation of western observers again — Hungarian—Soviet military exercises were
done.
In December 1988, Mikhail Gorbachew announced at the general assembly of
the UN the start of the decrease of the number of troops in Hungary, Poland and
Czechoslovakia. In November 1989, the ministers of defence of the Warsaw
Treaty only negotiated in Budapest about the "creation of adequate protection".
From this time on, there was a possibility for transforming the Warsaw Treaty into
a real defence organisation.
47
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
48
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
In January 1990, as part of the actions designed to strengthen trust in Europe,
the Hungarian—Canadian "Open Sky" military exercises "opened up the Hungarian
air-space" for the pilots of a NATO country.
Hungary, within its limited possibilities, played a pioneer role in the building of
the East-West connections. Because of its geographical position and basic eco-
nomic difficulties, Hungary had a vested interest in the improvement of the East-
West connections. In the period of the tensions between the super powers, Hun-
gary consciously tried to ease and not aggravate these tensions. The Hungarian
foreign policy was recognised for its consistent conflict-solving behaviour.
Hungary was the first among the socialist countries to realise the importance of
the European Economic Community, except for the German Democratic Republic,
which was in a specific situation because of the inner trade of the two Germanies.
Hungary already negotiated — at professional level — with the EEC about the im-
provement of the conditions of trade as soon as in 1982. The enlarging EEC be-
came more and more important in the Hungarian foreign trade. Hungary had a
vested interest in the development of the bilateral connections.
The neighbourhood connections showed a particular situation in the last years
of the socialism, if we look at them from the side of the "statistical permeability of
the border". Looking at the average length of state border per one road or railway
border station, we can see that from this aspect — after 1988, in almost all respects
—, the Austrian border was the most permeable, while the Soviet border the least
so. With the introduction of the world passport in 1988, masses of Hungarians
went to Austria for shopping purposes, but Hungary could not neglect the safety
expectations of the "socialist camp", e.g. the "iron curtain" constructed on the bor-
der could only be broken down at the end of the historical period. The two gov-
ernments made an agreement in February 1989 on the elimination of the sealing of
the border, and the technical sealing was broken down within a few weeks after
that.
In summary, both internal and external processes and determinations contrib-
uted to the creation of the "most cheerful barrack" situation. The dominant content
of this category were the relatively high living standards compared to the other
socialist states, the regulated but at the same time predictable freedom of move-
ment for a major part of the society, and the safety of public provision.
The external conditions for the birth of the "most cheerful barrack" were to a
large extent provided by the improvement of the relationship between the two su-
per powers and world systems. The Hungarian political leadership — for their own
and Hungary's interests — always followed a foreign political direction easing the
tensions both during the times of friendship and hostility.
49
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
7.3 From the economic crisis through the social crisis to the political systemic
change
The aggravating difficulties of the Hungarian economy were to a large extent the
consequences of the negative effects of the change of paradigm in the world econ-
omy and the deficiencies of adaptability. The Hungarian economy reacted late and
at the cost of huge economic losses to the vast rearrangement processes in the
world.
By the late 1970s, the possibilities for the economic growth became rather lim-
ited. Parallel to the increase of the amount of foreign debts, the economic—finan-
cial connections of Hungary to the West partially changed, a financial dependence
gradually appeared. Hungary's application for the membership of the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in November 1981 should be considered as
the recognition of the economic hardships and not as the first sign of a new politi-
cal orientation. From this time on, the economic situation and solvency of Hungary
received a wider home and international publicity.
The introduction of the emergency situation in Poland and the discussion of its
consequences gave a new momentum to the Hungarian intellectuals to asses the
situation, and the need of the so-called "Finlandisation" was gradually stated. Al-
though they had no real chance for a broader analysis of the topic, the need for the
loosening of the Hungarian—Soviet connections received more and more attention
outside the official circles.
The evident presence of the economic difficulties disintegrated the net of the
internal compromises that had been achieved and seemed as a kind of national
consensus. Before 1985, within the frameworks of the openly not (yet) question-
able single-party system, the statements of the political leadership were considered
as the only assessments of and influences on the situation of Hungary. (From the
underground existence, many things could already be questioned at that time, as
the first volume of the newspaper called "Beszelo" ["Parlour"] was published in
October 1982.)
At the new-system elections held in 1985, 25 representatives who got into the
Parliament were not nominated by the Patriotic People's Front. Among the MP-s,
77% were still members of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, but the elec-
tions created the personality conditions for the appearance of a more critical group
(which could not be called an opposition at that time, however).
The voluntaristic attempt made at the acceleration of the economic growth,
given the outdated economic structure, drove Hungary to the brink of insolvency
by 1988: the amount of foreign debts reached 18 billion USD. The stock of debts
turned into a self-inducing process of indebtedness.
With the discussion in Monor in 1985, the quasi-public organisation of the
forces of opposition started. The versatility of the programmes and efforts was
50
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
given from the very first moments of the start. After 1985 — parallel to the deep-
ening of the economic crisis and the gradual extension of political publicity — the
process of the reconsideration of the national affairs (first the river barrage system
on the Danube), and their assessment quite different from the official standpoints
started, as well as the public confrontation of the different opinions.
After 1986, on constitutional grounds, the establishment of different alternative
associations and organisations started. Some of these organisations still accepted
the political umbrella offered by the Patriotic People's Front (e.g. the Bajcsy-
Zsilinszky Endre Friendly Society), but in the draft of the programme declaration,
radically new claims were stated concerning the international situation of Hun-
gary:
• back to Europe (the Hungarian nation, as a sovereign state should be able to
freely join again the political, moral and economic community of the Euro-
pean peoples and states, and the European culture);
• Central European integration (the nations in Central Europe, on the grounds
of mutual benefits, without any external intervention, should make an eco-
nomic and political alliance to allow the democratic solution of any ethnic
minority issue);
• a single Hungarian nation (all the Hungarians — 16 million of them — should
be part of a single Hungarian nation. The Hungarian government has to rep-
resent the minorities at the international forums);
• an independent Hungary (Hungary, on the ground of the present national in-
terests, should reconsider the system of its international connections created
during the Stalinist era).
The social organisations gradually widened, movements (Hungarian Demo-
cratic Forum) and federations (Federation of the Young Democrats, Alliance of the
Free Democrats) appeared, which were not called parties but were parties in real-
ity. These political formations also dealt with the foreign policy orientation of
Hungary, without any prior commitments.
The Hungarian refugees fleeing from Romania, the ethnic minority policy and
the so-called settlement systematisation programme in Romania evoked demon-
strations which did not only question the "alliance" of the two countries but gradu-
ally started to carry the critique of the Hungarian political system, as well.
The party conference held in 1988, with the removal of Janos Kadar, brought
fundamental personality changes in the leadership of the HSWP, but in most of the
issues no consensus could be achieved within the party. The labelling of the trag-
edy of 1956 as popular rising by Imre Pozsgay questioned the legitimacy of not
only the party but also of those persons who were active participants in breaking
down the popular rising. In fact, there were not only historical but also hard power
and personal debates concerning the issue of 1956, not only in the society but also
within the party.
51
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
The leading organs of the HSWP approved of the introduction of the multi-
party system in February 1989. From this time on, the building out of the politi-
cally achieved, legally legitimised, real multi-party system accelerated.
One of the most essential issues of the political party programmes and declara-
tions published in 1989 was the reconsideration of the alliance connections of
Hungary, as well as the assessment of the possibilities and constrains. Each sig-
nificant force had to confront with the issue of the Warsaw Treaty and the
COMECON. In real political approach, most parties considered the reform of these
organisations as a minimum purpose, and the "approved" secession of Hungary as
a maximum one. In most political declarations, the support of the neutrality of
Hungary was present. Several parties stated the need for the simultaneous elimina-
tion of the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, and the creation of a collective Euro-
pean security system.
In June 1989, the National Round Table talks started about the present and fu-
ture of Hungary. The stake was the peaceful, compromise-based transformation.
The main focuses of the negotiations were home political issues, but there were
debates on the orientation of the Hungarian foreign policy, too.
The Hungarian government, by "letting go" the refugees of the GDR in Sep-
tember, clearly broke with the former political practice of the socialist states. The
"mass opening of the iron curtain" had an international effect and affected the in-
ternal circumstances of the GDR.
At the 16th congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, organised in 6-
10 October 1989, the HSWP dissolved itself without a legal successor, and the
Hungarian Socialist Party was founded. The dissolution of the former state party
created a new situation for everybody. The HSP was forced into a political com-
petition in the new situation, carrying the burden of the political past of its leaders.
The democratic transitions taking place in the neighbouring socialist countries
questioned the very essence of the former economic, political and military struc-
tures, and the unity of the "socialist camp".
In the sphere of action of the Hungarian foreign policy, a new element was the
possibility to deepen the inter-state co-operations with Yugoslavia, Italy and Aus-
tria. The neutral Austria, the non-committed Yugoslavia, the NATO member Italy
and Hungary belonging to the Warsaw Treaty conducted consultations at high
level about the tighter economic and political collaboration of the countries in the
region. In addition to this initiative, it is worth noting that the government handed
in Hungary's application to join the Council of Europe.
In March 1990, the Hungarian and the Soviet governments made an agreement
upon the complete evacuation of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. After the
signing of the agreement, the evacuation of the troops started almost immediately.
The start of the evacuation also carried a home political message, namely that the
52
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
Hungarian Socialist Party was able to restore the national sovereignty and the for-
eign political representation of the independent country.
In the election campaign of 1990, a cardinal issue was the orientation of the
Hungarian foreign policy and the issue of Hungary's neutrality. Looking at the
detailed opinions of the different parties about the foreign policy and the alliance
policy, we can see that there was a broad agreement among the parties in the fol-
lowing issues:
• the Hungarian sovereignty has to be restored;
• Hungary has to return to Europe.
In April, the heads of state and prime ministers of Czechoslovakia, Poland and
Hungary negotiated about the extension of the co-operation among the transform-
ing democracies. In reality, this was when the process of the construction of the
"Visegrad Group" started. The basic issue was the harmonisation of the common
participation of the Warsaw Treaty's more developed, western countries, more
advanced in the democratic transformation, with the potential leadership of Po-
land.
In the last decade of the state socialism, the economic and political crisis, and
the systemic crisis were connected to each other and became a self-inducing proc-
ess. The previous internal social consensus and legitimacy ceased to exist, and the
rearrangements in the world policy amplified the processes of the search for a new
orientation.
53
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
8 Hungary in the "grey zone":
Out of the Warsaw Treaty and the COMECON — but where?
The changes of the economic, social, political and power structure of Hungary
were parallel to the global transformation of the former world system. The Euro-
pean structures significantly changed and the former alliance system ceased to ex-
ist. The shaping "grey zone" brought a new sphere of action, a kind of liberty, new
responsibilities and challenges, and also fears for Hungary.
At the multi-party parliamentary election of 1990, the Hungarian Democratic
Forum won (with 156 mandates out of the 376), but they did not achieve an abso-
lute majority. After the foundation of the new Parliament — before the new gov-
ernment entering into office — the revision of the relationship between Hungary
and the Warsaw Treaty, and the necessity of the settling of the situation were al-
most immediately put in the schedule. The Parliament rejected the possibility of
the unilateral secession and asked the new government to start negotiations on the
secession.
The Hungarian Democratic Forum was only able to found a government with
its coalition partners (Independent Smallholders Party and the Christian Demo-
cratic People's Party). The foreign policy part of the government programme was
real political one inasmuch as the new government declared that it respected the
previous international contracts, at the same time, it set new objectives according
to the new political situation, giving priority to the efforts aiming at the European
integration.
The co-operation of the countries in the Adriatic—Danubian region was given a
new emphasis after the Hungarian elections (Pentagonale). The "inter-block" for-
mation played an important role in maintaining the stability in the region; it
showed a direct political support for the democratic transformation by the West.
The Hungarian Parliament made a very important declaration both from home
and foreign political aspect on 31. May 1990, the 70th anniversary of the signing
of the Trianon Peace Treaty. The Parliament stated that it considered the state bor-
ders of Hungary as realistic, and it wished to shape the neighbourhood connection
of the country on this ground.
Hungary joined the EFTA (June 1990), took up the diplomatic relations with
the NATO (July 1990), the European Economic Community opened its embassy in
Budapest (November 1990). The creation of the diplomatic relations between the
NATO, the EEC and Hungary, still a member of the COMECON and the Warsaw
Treaty, was a recognition and a kind of support of the foreign policy of the new
Hungarian government.
In September 1990, the Hungarian government contributed to the GDR's seces-
sion from the Warsaw Treaty. As a consequence of the creation of the German
unity, this measure was logical in all respects, at the same time it reinforced the
54
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
basis of the legal perception of Hungary, i.e. the possibility of secession from the
treaty. In October, the Hungarian government reinforced its wish to secede from
the military organisation of the Warsaw Treaty until the end of 1991. (Thus the
need to secede completely from the organisation was not mentioned yet at that
time.)
In January 1991, Hungary participated with ambulance units in the action called
"Desert Storm" against Iraq, which aimed at the elimination of the invasion of
Kuwait by Iraq. The action took place under the auspices of the UN, but in effect
using the military power of the USA. Hungary demonstrated its new international
sphere of action and also its commitment to the western values.
The new government paid a greater attention than ever before to improving the
situation of the Hungarian ethnic minorities living beyond the borders of Hungary.
The statement of the Prime Minister, Jozsef Antall, that he wished to be "the prime
minister of 15 million Hungarians in spirit", signed the start of the elaboration of a
new national policy, and the foreign policy became an executive of this policy.
The neighbourhood policy to a large extent was identical with issue of the Hun-
garian minorities, especially in Romania.
The Hungarian relationships towards the EEC and the NATO gradually
strengthened. It was not a "double-dealing" policy but the quest for the opportuni-
ties in an extremely complicated international and internal situation. The USA and
Western Europe themselves were not prepared for such developments, such rapid
transitions in the East. The approach to Europe was indicated by the fact that Hun-
gary became a full-power member of the Council of Europe.
In the neighbourhood policy, the Hungarian—Czechoslovakian relationship was
still affected by the issue of the hydroelectric station at Bos, in fact, the disagree-
ments were deepened by the Czechoslovakian announcement in January 1991 of
continuing the constructions in their own territory. The result of these works was
the diversion of the Danube River. (The case was taken to the International Court
at the Hague, but the decision of the court in itself did not solve the tensions of the
different objectives and types of actions of the two countries.)
In February 1991, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary signed a co-operation
agreement. The co-operation of the Visegrad countries was an attempt to fill out a
political—power vacuum, but Poland was too weak in all respects to become a rec-
ognized, leading factor in the region.
At the special meeting of the Political Consultative Body of the Warsaw Treaty
in Budapest on 25. February, the previous military contracts were considered as
null and void, in addition, it was stated that the military organisation of the War-
saw Treaty would cease to exist as of 31. March 1991. On 19. June, the last Soviet
soldier left the territory Hungary.
On 28. June 1991, Hungary approved of the elimination of the COMECON,
and this way its economic relationships not only to the ex member states but also
55
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
to all regions changed. A few days after that, a decision was made on the complete
elimination of the Warsaw Treaty, and not only its military institutional system.
On 1. July 1991, Hungary became a free country in all respects, outside any block,
outside any economic integration, and without the presence of any foreign troops.
The tension in the Yugoslav region, which gradually turned to a civil war after
August 1991, had a negative effect on the relationship between Hungary and
Yugoslavia. The debates were especially sharp about the shipment of arms from
Hungary to Croatia, later the armed violations of the frontier by Yugoslavia.
Parallel to the transformation of the neighbourhood environment, in November
1991 Hungary signed the association treaty with the EEC. The signing of this as-
sociation treaty was of vital importance for the collaboration between Hungary and
the EEC, as Hungary now had a contractual relationship with the EEC, which, al-
though does not lead to the actual membership, can be considered as the first step
in the process of the accession.
The attempted coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991, then the disintegration
of the Soviet Union in December of the same year created a fundamentally new
situation for Hungary. With the birth of the independent Ukraine and the new Rus-
sia, and the establishment of the CIS, new state structures, new power relations
and a new system of interests were created along the northeastern borders of Hun-
gary and in the wider eastern region.
The new stresses in the neighbourhood policy are indicated by the fact that
Hungary was among the first ones to recognize the independence of Croatia and
Slovenia on 15. January 1992, and established the diplomatic relations with the
new neighbours. Hungary stressed its neutrality in the Yugoslav crisis (especially
because of the Hungarian population of the Vajdasag/Voivodina area), but actually
it sympathised with the Croatian and Slovenian efforts, and supported them as far
as it was possible.
The Hungarian—Sereb relations were not only burdened by these measures of
Hungary, but also the fact that Hungary joined the punitive sanctions initiated by
the international community. During the control of the sanctions, new relations
were created between Hungary and the Western European integrational organisa-
tions. (Hungary suffered a great financial loss, but politically gained a lot with the
keeping of these sanctions. However, the real winners were the Hungarian and
Yugoslav smugglers living in the border region.)
The Hungarian government wanted to settle its relations to its neighbours, the
successor states of the Soviet Union, and its most important partners. The first
document of this type was the treaty between Hungary and Germany, signed in
February 1992. This was followed by the Hungarian—Lithuanian, the Hungarian—
Croatian and the Hungarian—Ukrainian treaties. (This latter was questioned by
many, which led to an internal crisis of the coalition, and the government was only
able to have it passed by a few votes from the opposition.)
56
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
With the disintegration of Czechoslovakia in January 1993, a new state and a
new situation emerged along the northern borders of Hungary, too. The proportion
of the Hungarian minority increased within the new borders of Slovakia, which did
not solve but in many aspects complicated the relationship between the two coun-
tries.
In summary, the neighbourhood environment of Hungary was fundamentally
rearranged in the early 1990s (see Figure 8 and Table 3). The positions of Hungary
definitely strengthened compared to the new successor states. The majority of the
Hungarian society and the political elite showed a great self-control in connection
with the transition processes going on in the neighbouring states, and this self-
control was typical of the major part of the Hungarian minority living in the neigh-
bouring countries, as well. Hungary and the Hungarian populations were seen as a
factor in the stability of the region.
The free trade association made between the neighbouring states (CEFTA)
meant both the appearance of new chances and forms of co-operation and — espe-
cially as concerns the export of agricultural products — the open conflict and awk-
ward management of the different interests. Still, the CEFTA plays a positive role
within the connections of the ex-socialist countries, because it gives an opportunity
for the experience and handling of some expected consequences of the EU inte-
gration.
Table 3
Hungary and neighboring countries, 1993
Country
Territory
Population
GDP/capita
Ratio of state
Number of
(km2)
(million)
(USD)
nation
Hungarians
(thousand)
Hungary
93030
10.3
3300
92%
10,222
Austria
83859
7.9
23120
93%
16,000
Croatia
56538
4.8
2020
75%
26,000
Romania
237500
22.8
1120
89%
1,598
Slovakia
49036
5.4
1900
86%
567,000
Slovenia
20253
2.0
6310
88%
10,000
Ukraine
603700
52.1
1350
73%
155,000
Yugoslavia
102173
10.7
900
62%
385,000
57
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
1993
ary,
Hung
f
o
tes
ta
s
hbour
ig
ne
new
The
00
0
an
58
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
9 At the door of the NATO, in the waiting room of the European
Union
The new socialist—liberal parliamentary majority after the elections of 1994 was a
large-scale continuity as regards the foreign policy orientation of Hungary, it was
only the neighbourhood relations where something changed — which is not to say
that new efforts were pursued, maybe the attitude changed slightly. The Hungar-
ian—Romanian and Hungarian—Slovak treaties made by the new coalition served
both the settling of the bilateral connections and the Hungarian efforts to become a
NATO and a European Union member state. The new socialist—liberal coalition
continued, in fact, it accelerated the preparation for both the NATO and the EU
accession.
9.1 At the door of the NATO
Within the new global and continental circumstances, the issue of the enlargement
of the NATO naturally raised and still raises the question of the security of
Ukraine and Russia. The programme called "Partnership for Peace" was a kind of
need for the strengthening of the trust in January 1994. As the Treaty wanted to
prove that it did not consider as enemies the two, militarily most powerful succes-
sor states of the Soviet Union, it had to integrate them in some way within the
frameworks of the common security system. The special contractual relationship
made with the two countries gave a kind of minimum guarantee for the two Soviet
successor states.
Among the small ex-socialist countries, a sort of natural competition started for
getting in the first round of the NATO enlargement. The membership was mostly
an external guarantee of the security, on the other hand, a high-level recognition of
the internal democratisation for those who were striving for the accession.
The decision of the NATO in July 1997 on the invitation of the Czech Repub-
lic, Poland and Hungary was basically the sign of the inner compromise of the
member states, also, the recognition to some extent of the democratic development
that had taken place in these three countries.
The NATO membership of Hungary, after the successful referendum and the
completion of the ratification procedure by the member states, was achieved in
March 1999. In the present political and military constellation, and in the compli-
cated economic interest system, Hungary became a NATO member sooner than it
is acceded to the European Union. In the beginning of the internal transformation
process, the opposite situation seemed to be more possible.
Hungary is in a very special situation in the present territorial structure of the
NATO, it is an "inland island", given that it has no common inland border with
59
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
any of the present member states. This isolated location will not be a problem if
the NATO orientation policy of Slovenia is continued, which seems to be the case,
also, if a similar effort takes place by Slovakia after the elections in 1998. (The
internal political debate of Austria abut the advantages and disadvantages of the
eternal neutrality and the NATO membership will probably last for years.)
Hungary belongs to the Southern Headquarters of the NATO — which increases
the importance of Slovenia —, and this connection will probably exert its effects in
other respects, too. Hungary as a NATO member is situated close the location of
the protracting Bosnian crisis, and the air-base of Taszar will be an important lo-
gistic centre in the coming period of time.
The NATO membership does not affect the sovereignty of Hungary formally
(not all of the military and political consequences of the accession are automatic),
but in practice, every new connection and every issue of the security policy is
given a new emphasis now that Hungary is within the Treaty.
The most important interest of Hungary, beyond its own security, is that Roma-
nia and Slovakia, in addition to Slovenia, should also be integrated within the
treaty in the second round. The security of the country would increase thereby,
also, the major part of the Hungarian ethnic minority would belong to one alliance
system and share the same democratic political values.
9.2 In the waiting room of the European Union
The European Union reached a new era of its history by the late 1990s. It has to
give an answer to the questions of the deepening of the integration, the introduc-
tion of the common currency and all its operational experiences gathered so far.
All of this has to be achieved within such circumstances when new efforts of the
assertion of national interests within the EU emerge.
In the Luxembourg summit of the EU held in December 1997, the circle of the
countries invited for the accession negotiation was settled, and Hungary became a
part of the 5+1 formation. The accession negotiations and the enlargement itself
were of secondary importance compared to the implementation of the inner re-
form. This situation has far-leading consequences, and not only for Hungary.
The accession negotiations with the European Union can last for a long time,
and the former date in the " hypothesis of the accession works", 2002, might be
prolonged with a number of years. The chances of this are strengthened day after
day by the different involvements and interests of the EU countries in the enlarge-
ment, and because of their increasing conflicts of interests.
The foreign trade relations of Hungary are already dominated by the EU, thus
the accession — despite the visible and invisible risks of both parties — is urgent
from this respect. However, it is also the long-term interest of Hungary to join a
well-functioning EU with a clear structure and clear objectives.
60
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
With the NATO membership and hopefully the European Union membership
within a foreseeable future, Hungary will definitely become part of the Euro-
Atlantic integration organisations and processes. By these processes, Hungary
turns from "the West of the East to the East of the West", and not only in a topog-
raphical sense.
61
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
10 Summary
The politico-geographical and geopolitical situation of a country is determined by
external (world political, continental and neighbourhood) and internal factors. The
external environment in the broader sense means those general conditions within
which the internally defined, legitimised purposes and interests can range. The
internal legal and social legitimacy is especially important in the field of the
"alliance connections", but can also be seen in the field of the "enemy image", too.
Until World War I, the Austro—Hungarian Monarchy, as one of the traditional
great powers of Europe, was part of the European power equilibrium. The relation-
ship of the Monarchy towards the other great powers could develop in several dif-
ferent ways.
The alliance system of the Central Powers, including the Monarchy, was de-
feated in World War I. The Monarchy, as a joint effect of the war defeat and the
secession efforts of its ethnic minorities, disintegrated.
Hungary restored its territorial sovereignty, but had to face the secession of the
ethnic minorities of the historical Hungary and the promises of the winners made
during the war. Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and population, in a way
that one-third of the Hungarian ethnic group was given to the successor states.
In the period between the two world wars, Hungary acted, more exactly strug-
gled within the constraints of and possibilities for creating the conditions for the
achievement of the socially defined and legitimised purpose, the territorial revi-
sion. Hungary had no power position, weight and possibility at all for the imple-
mentation of this objective on its own, thus it necessarily was connected to those
countries which questioned the former peace treaty.
During World War II, both the real politics and the ideological barriers ap-
peared in the foreign policy of Hungary. As regarded the Soviet Union, the ideo-
logical barrier was dominant, even when the territorial claims of Hungary went
hand in hand with those of the Soviet Union (in connection with Romania).
After the defeat in World War II, both the old and the new political forces had
to accept the fact that the territory of Hungary was liberated by the Soviet Union,
and the Red Army was present in the Hungarian territory. The Soviet Union domi-
nated even the internal processes, partly through the Hungarian Communists and
partly directly.
The belonging of Hungary to the socialist alliance system was mostly a con-
nection to the leading power of the alliance, the Soviet Union, and the bilateral
relationships with the other member states were of secondary importance. Both the
Warsaw Treaty and the COMECON were actually single-pole organisations, de-
spite the formal declaration of the equality of the member states. The essence of
both organisations, especially that of the military one, was dominated by the situa-
tion coming from the size and world political position of the Soviet Union.
62
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
The bipolar world after World War II, the divided Europe, and the opposition
of the capitalist and socialist systems and military blocks developed with ups and
downs after 1975 — starting from the acceptance of the Helsinki Proclamation —,
but the tendency was the decrease of the opposition.
The economic and political crisis of the socialist countries bore new dangers
after the 1980s, but the conflict of the two world systems ceased to exist in reality,
as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The transition period was mostly determined by the world powers and the
world policy, the possibilities of Hungary to influence it was limited. In the new
situation that emerged from the late 1980s, the possibilities of Hungary funda-
mentally changed. From 1990 on, a new situation gradually appeared around and
for Hungary. The elimination of the Warsaw Treaty, the evacuation of the Soviet
troops, the disintegration of the COMECON, as well as the internal socio-
economic and political transformation, the elimination of the former political in-
stitutional system and the systemic change — these all offered new possibilities for
Hungary to shape its internal conditions and its international relations.
During this decade, the Hungarian state socialist system, as a consequence of
the external and internal transformations, was first questioned, and then it failed at
the democratic, multi-party elections of 1990. This date is one of the most impor-
tant turning points of this period of history, as it established the independence of
Hungary, outside any military block.
Not only the world political environment of Hungary changed basically, but its
European connections, and also its neighbourhood relations were essentially trans-
formed. Hungary had already established connections towards the Western Euro-
pean integration organisations, and in the new situation the Hungarian political
leadership and public opinion defined as a basic objective and value the accession
to the transforming European Union, and started the conscious preparation for the
accession process and the expected membership.
The changes taking place in the neighbourhood of Hungary can be seen in the
disintegration of the former socialist federations and an increase in the number of
independent neighbour states. The newly independent states (Slovakia, Ukraine,
Croatia and Slovenia) have less weight than their predecessor states in many re-
spects, increasing the sphere of action of Hungary in its neighbourhood environ-
ment. The development processes of the the neighbouring states were burdened by
uncertainties, especially the civil wars raging in the Yugoslav region raised secu-
rity challenges for Hungary, at the same time, these bloody events accelerated the
convergence of Hungary and the NATO.
The accession to the Euro-Atlantic military organisation (in March 1999) basi-
cally changed the external security policy situation of Hungary. Hungary is now
within the frameworks of the European stability.
63
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
Bibliography
Agnew, J. — Corbridge, S. (1989): The new geopolitics: the dynamics of global disorder. In Johnston,
R. J. — Taylor, P. (eds.) A World in Crisis?: geographical perspectives. Oxford etc. Basil Black-
well, pp. 266-288.
Ankler, G. (1997): Nyugat van, kelet nincs (There is West, but no East). — Valosag, Vol. XL. No. 8.
pp. 1-125.
Aubert, A. et al. (eds.) (1993): Regional problems in East-Central Europe after the political changes.
Pecs, Department of General Social Geography and Urbanistics of Janus Pannonius University
and Centre for Regional Studies of Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
Balogh, A. (1998): Integmicio es nemzeti irdek (Integration and the Interests of Hungary). Budapest,
Kossuth KOnyvkiad6.
Balogh, S. (1988): Magyarorszag kiilpolitiketja, 1945-1950 (Hungarian Foreign Policy, 1945-1950).
Budapest, Kossuth KOnyvkiado. Second edition.
Bdtky, Zs. — Kogutowicz K. (eds.) (1921): Kogutowicz zsebatlasza az 1922. eitre (Kogutowicz's
Pocket Atlas for the year 1922). Budapest, Magyar Neprajzi Tarsasdg Emberfoldrajzi Szakosz-
tdlya.
Beluszky, P. (1995): KOzep-Europa — merre vagy? (Where are you, Central Europe?) — Foldrajzi
Kozlemenyek, Vol. CXIX. (XLIII.) No. 3-4. pp. 223-232.
Berndt, T. (ed.) (1985): An economic geography of Hungary. Budapest, Akademiai Kiad6.
Bierman, D. E. — Loboda, J. (1992): East-Central Europe. (Land and its people in historical prospec-
tive.) NORDIC.
Bognar, K. (1993): A biztonsag es a biztonsagpolitika hazankban (Security and Security Policy in
Hungary). — Tarsadalmi Szemle, Vol. XLVIII. No. I. pp. 39-48.
Bognar, K. (1995): Redlisan a NATO-tagsagrol (A realistic view of the NATO membership). — Had-
tudomany, No. 1. pp. 3-14.
Borsody, I. (1998): Az etj Kozip-Europa (The New Central Europe). Szombathely, Savaria University
Press.
Bozeki, A. (1998): Regionalizmus, dllamkOzi verseny es geopolitika: az eur6pai integracio es Kozep-
Europa (Regionalism, inter-state competition and geopolitics: the European integration and Cen-
tral Europe). — Politikatudomanyi Szemle, Vol. II. No. 2. pp. 131-153.
Burdac, J. et al. (eds.) (1998): The political geography of current East-West relations. Leipzig, Bei-
trage zur Regionalen Geographie, No. 47. Institut fiir Landerkunde.
Carter, F. W. (1995): Kozep-Europa: valosag vagy fOldrajzi fikci6? (Central Europe: A reality or a
geographical fiction?) — Foldrajzi Kozlemenyek, Vol. CXIX. (XLIII.) No. 3 — 4. pp. 232-250.
Czirbusz, G. (1919): Geopolitika (Geopolitics). Budapest, Franklin-Tarsulat.
Deak, P. (1997): Unios biztonsdgpolitika: egyseges, kozos vagy egyeztetett? (Security policy in the
Union: single, common or harmonised?) — Europai nadir, Vol. II. No. 1. pp. 47-59.
Dioszegi, 1. (1970): Hazank es Europa. (Tanulmanyok) (Hungary and Europe. Essays.). Budapest,
Magveto KOnyvkiado.
Dioszegi, I. (1991): Szuverenitas, biztonsdg, integritas. Meditaci6 a kiilpolitika termeszeterol. (Sover-
eignty, security and integrity. Thoughts about the nature of foreign policy). — Tarsadalmi Szemle,
Vol. XLVI. No. 3. pp. 3-14.
Edvi Illes, A. — Haldsz, A. (eds.) (1921): Magyarorszag gazdasagi terkepekben (Hungary in Eco-
nomic Maps). Budapest, Pallas nyomda.
Erhart, H-G. (1997): Ukrajna es a Nyugat (Ukraine and the West). — Europai Szemle, Vol. VIII. No.
3. pp. 25-37.
Enyedi, Gy. (1978): Kelet-Kiizip-Europa gazdascigfOldrajza (Economic Geography of East—Central
Europe). Budapest, Kozgazdasdgi es Jogi KonyvkiadO.
64
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
Feller, F. — Heller, A. (1990): Jalta utan. (Kelet-Eurnpa hosszd forradalma Jalta ellen.) (After Yalta.
The Long Revolution of Eastern Europe Against Yalta). Budapest, Kossuth KOnyvkiad6.
Fischer, F. (1992): A megosztott vilcig. (A kelet-nyugat, eszak-del nemzetkOzi kapcsolatok fo vondsai,
1945-1989 (The divided world. The main characteristics of the East-West and North-South inter-
national connections in 1945-1989). Budapest, Ikva.
Fischer, F. (1996): A megosztott vilag tortinelmi-politikai atlasza, 1941-1991 (The Historical-
Political Map of the Divided World, 1941-1991). Pecs—Budapest, Janus Pannonius University,
Pedag6gus Szakma Megtijitasa Projekt Programiroda.
Gyarmati, Gy. (1992): Focleraci6s tOrekvesek a masodik vilaghabord utan (Federalist efforts after
World War II.). Politikatudomanyi Szemle, Vol. II. No. 2. pp. 111-121.
Gyarmati, Gy. (1997): A revizi6 alternativaja. (A regionalis integraci6 formavaltozatai a magyar
poltikai gondolkoddsban, 1920-1944.) (An alternative of the revision. The changes of the per-
ception of regional integration in the Hungarian political thinking, 1920-1944). — Limes, No. 2.
pp. 43-58.
Hajdd, Z. (1995): Geopolitical restructuring of East-Central Europe: Hungary as an example. In:
Tykkylainen, M. (ed.) Local and Regional Development During the 1990s Transition in Eastern
Europe. Aldershot, etc. Avebury, pp. 5-18.
Hajdd, Z. (1995): A magyar allamter valtozasainak torteneti es politikai fOldrajzi szemlelete a magyar
fOldrajztudomanyban 1948-ig (The historical and political geographical perception of the changes
of the territory of Hungary until 1948). — Ter es Thrsadalom, Vol 9. No. 3-4. pp. 111-132.
Halasz, A. (1928): New Central Europe in Economic Maps. Budapest, Gergely.
Handk, P. (ed.) (1988): One Thousand Years. A concise history of Hungary. Budapest, Corina Press.
Hankiss, E. (1989): Kelet-europai alternativalc. Feheren feketen (Eastern European Alternatives in
Black and White). Budapest, Kozgazdasdgi es Jogi KOnyvkiadd.
Hargitai, A.-ne — Izikne Hedri, G. — Palankai, T. (eds.) (1995): Europa zsebkonyv. (Az Europai Uni6
es Magyarorszag.) (A pocket book of Europe. The European Union and Hungary). Budapest,
EURATION, Hanns Seidel Alapftvdny.
Havass, R. 1902: Magyar imperializmus (Hungarian Imperialism). Budapest, Budapesti Hirlap.
Herczegh, G. (1987): Magyarorszag kalpolitikaja, 896-1918 (Hungarian Foreign Policy in 896-
1918). Budapest, Kossuth Konyvkiac16.
Hunke, H. et al. n. d. EurOpai gazdasagi egyattm liked& (Economic Co-operation in Europe). Buda-
pest, Stadium.
Inotai, A. (1998): On the way. Hungary and the European Union. Budapest, Belvdrosi KOnyvkiado.
Izikne, Hedri G. (ed.) (1995): Magyarorszcig dton az Europai Unioba (Hungary on Its Way to the
European Union). Budapest, Aula KiadO.
Jambor, J. (1998): Torpeallamok a tortinelmi Magyarorszag foldjen (Miniature States in the Terri-
tory of the Historical Hungary). Budapest, Zs-Libra.
Janning, J. — Weidenfeld, W. (eds.) (1993): Europe in Global Change. (Strategies and options for
Europe.) Gutersloh, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers.
Juhasz, Gy. (1969): Magyarorszcig kiilpolitikcija 1919-1945. (Hungarian foreign policy in 1919-
1945.). Budapest, Akadetniai Kiado.
Juhasz, V. (ed.) n. d.: A regi es az Of EurOpa atlasza. (TOrteneti attekintes Europa korszakos val-
tozdsairol a mai napig.) (Atlas of the Old and the New Europe. A historical review of the major
changes of Europe until now). Budapest, Dante.
Kalmar, G. n. d. Magyar geopolitika (Hungarian Geopolitics). Budapest, Stadium.
Kassai, G. (1959): Trianon es Parizs (Trianon and Paris). Budapest, Magyar-Szovjet Barati Tarsasdg.
Keri, L. (1992): Between Two Systems. Seven studies on the Hungarian Political Changes. Budapest,
Institute for Political Science of Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
Kennedy, P. (1992): Nagyhatalmak tundOklese es bukcisa (Rise and Fall of Great Powers). Budapest,
Akademiai Kiad6.
65
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
Kiraly, B. — Romsics, I. (eds.) (1998): Geopolitics in the Danube region. (Hungarian reconciliation
efforts, 1848-1998). Budapest, Central European University Press.
Kissinger, H. (1996): Diplomcicia (Diplomacy). Budapest, Panem-McGraw-Hill-Grafo.
Kovacs-Bertrand, A. (1997): Der ungarische Revisionismus nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Munchen, R.
Oldenbourg Verlag.
Kovacs, Z. (1989): Border changes and their effect on the structure of Hungarian society. — Political
Geography Quarterly, Vol. 8. No. 1. pp. 79-86.
Lendvai, L. F. (1997): Kozip-Europa koncepciok (Concepts of Eastern Europe). Budapest, Aron
Ki ado.
Nagy, L. (1993): Magyarorszcig Europciban. (A honfoglalast61 a kozelmtiltig) (Hungary in Europe.
From the conquest until the recent past). Budapest, Honffy Kiac16.
Nagy, L. (1995): Oroszorszag es a NATO (Russia and the NATO). — Hadtudomany, No. 3. pp. 15 —
28.
OECD (1993): Hungary. OECD Economic Surveys. Paris, OECD.
O'Loughlin, J. — Wusten, H. (eds.) (1993): The New Political Geography of Eastern Europe. London,
Belhaven.
OMFB (1997): TcijekortatO Magyarorszcig es az EU tagorszagok gazdascigi adatairol, 1990-1995.
(Report on the economic data of Hungary and the EU Member States, 1990-1995). Budapest,
OMFB.
OMFB (1997): Tcijekortato Magyarorszcig es a CEFTA orszcigok gazdasagi adatairol, 1990-1995.
(Report on the economic data of Hungary and the CEFTA States, 1990-1995). Budapest, OMFB.
Ormos, M. (1983): Pcidovcitol Trianonig (From Padova to Trianon). Budapest, Kossuth.
Owen, D. (1995): Balkan Odyssey. London, Victor Gollanz.
Palotas, Z. (1990): A trianoni hatcirok (The Trianon Borders). Budapest, Interedition.
Pap, N.—Toth, J. (eds.) (1997): Europa politikai foldrajza (The Political Geography of Europe). Pecs,
Janus Pannonius University.
Pandi, L. (1995): Kortes-Europa, 1763-1993. (Terkepgyiljtemeny) (In-Between Europe, 1763-1993.
A collection of maps). Budapest, Osiris—Szazadveg.
Ranki, Gy. (1983): Gazdasag es kidpolitika (Economy and Foreign Policy). Budapest, Magveto.
Ring, E. (ed.) (1986): Helyiink Europaban. (Nezetek es koncepciok a XX. szazadi Magyarorszagon)
(Our Place in Europe. Views and Concepts of Hungary in the 20th Century). Budapest, Magvetti
Konyvkiado, I—II. kotet.
Romsics, 1. (1996): Helyiink es sorsunk a Duna-medenceben (Our Place and Destiny in the Danubian
Basin). Budapest, Osiris Kiado.
Romsics, 1. (1998): Nemzet, nemzetiseg es allam Kelet-Kozip- es Delkelet-Europaban a XIX. es XX.
szozadban (Nation, nationality and state in East-Central Europe and Southeast Europe in the 19th
and 20'h century). Budapest, Napvilag Kiado.
Romsics, I. (ed.) (1997): Integracios torekvisek Keizip- es Kelet-Europciban a 19. es 20. szcizadban
(Integration Efforts in Central and Eastern Europe in the 19th and 20th Century). Budapest,
Teleki Lasz16 Alapftvany.
Romsics, I. (ed.) (1998): Trianon es a magyar politikai gondolkodcis, 1920-1953 (Trianon and the
Hungarian political thinking, 1920-1953). Budapest, Osiris.
Roltrke, J. T. (1991): International Politics on the World Stage. Guilford, DPG. Third edition.
Ronai, A. (1945): Atlas of Central Europe. Balatonfiired, Budapest. Allamtudomanyi Intezet.
ROnai, A. (1947): Teriileti problemcik Kozip-Europaban (Territorial Problems in Central Europe). In:
A Magyar Foldraji Tarsasag Zsebkonyve 1947. Budapest, Magyar Foldrajzi Intezet Rt. pp. 65-
85.
Shafir, M. (1985): Romania. (Politics, Economics and Society.) Marxist Regimes Series. London,
Pinter etc.
66
Hajdú, Zoltán: Changes in the Politico-Geographical Position of Hungary in the 20th Century.
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1998. 67 p.
Discussion Papers, No. 22.
Siposne Kecskemethy, K. — Nagy, M. (1995): A magyar katonafoldrajz alapkerdesenek valtozasa es
vizsgalati mutat6i (The transition of the basic issues of the Hungarian military geography and its
research indices). — Foldrajzi Ertesito, Vol. XLIV. No. 1-2. pp. 71-89.
Stark, T. (1993): Ut a bekeszerzOdeshez (Road to the peace treaty). — Szcizadok, Vol. 127. No. 5-6.
pp. 781-851.
Story, J. (ed.) (1993): The new Europe. (Politics, Government and Economy since 1945). Oxford, etc.
Blackwell.
Swain, N. (1992): Hungary. The Rise and Fall of Feasible Socialism. London, etc. Verso.
SztirOs, M. (1985): Hazank es a nagyvilag (Hungary and the World). Budapest, Kossuth KOnyvkiado.
Sztiros, M. (1987): Hazank es Europa (Hungary and Europe). Budapest, Kossuth KOnyvkiado.
Teleki, P. (1923): The evolution of Hungary and Its Place in European History. New York, The
Macmillan Company.
Teleki, P. n. d. Europarol es Magyarorszcigrol (Of Europe and Hungary). Budapest, Athenaeum.
Tilkovszki, L. (1967): Revizi6 es nemzetisegpolitika Magyarorszcigon (1938-1941) (Revision and
Ethnic Minority Policy in Hungary in 1938-1941). Budapest, Akademiai Kiad6.
Urban, A. (1972): Ujkori egyetemes tortinet 1789-1918. Terkepvc'zzlat-gAjtemeny (History of the
New Era, 1789-1918. A collection of map drafts). Budapest, TankOnyvkiado.
VERIDICUS: (1934): There is No Peace Without the Solution of the Danubian Question. The fatal
peace treaty of Trianon. Budapest, Magyar FOldrajzi Intezet Rt.
Weidenfeld, W. (ed.) (1995): Central and Eastern Europe on the Way into the European Union.
(Problems and prospects of integration.) Gtitersloh, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers.
Wolchik, S. L. (1991): Czechoslovakia in Transition: politics, economics and society. London, New
York, Pinter.
Zsiga, T. (1991): Burgenland, vagy Nyugat-Magyarorszag? (Burgenland or Western Hungary?)
Oberwalt, Burgenlandi Magyar Kulttlregyestilet.
Zsigmond, L. (ed.) (1966): Magyarorszcig es a masodik vilaghciborti. (Titkos diplomaciai okmanyok
a habora elozmenyeihez es tortenetehez.) (Hungary and World War II. Secret Diplomatic Files:
contributions to the preliminaries and history of the war). Budapest, Kossuth KonyvkiadO. Har-
madik kiadas.
67
Discussion Papers 1998. No. 22.
Changes in the Politico-Geographical
Position of Hungary in the 20th Century
The Discussion Papers series of the Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences was launched in 1986 to publish summaries of research
findings on regional and urban development.
The series has 4 or 5 issues a year. It will be of interest to geographers,
economists, sociologists, experts of law and political sciences, historians and
everybody else who is, in one way or another, engaged in the research of spatial
aspects of socio-economic development and planning.
The series is published by the Centre for Regional Studies.
Individual copies are available on request at the Centre.
Postal address
Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
P.O. Box 199,7601 PECS, HUNGARY
Phone: (36-72) 212-755,233-704
Fax: (36-72) 233-704
www.rkk.hu
www.dti.rkk.hu
Director general
Gyula HORVATH
Editor
Zoltan GAL
Galz@dti.rkk.hu
* * *
Forthcoming in the Discussion Papers series
Spatial Research in Supporting the European Integration, Special Issue
Discussion Papers 1998. No. 22.
Changes in the Politico-Geographical
Position of Hungary in the 20th Century
Papers published in the Discussion Papers series
No. 1 OROSZ, Eva (1986): Critical Issues in the Development of Hungarian Public Health
with Special Regard to Spatial Differences
No. 2 ENYEDI, Gyorgy — ZENTAI, Viola (1986): Environmental Policy in Hungary
No. 3 HAJDU, Zoltan (1987): Administrative Division and Administrative Geography in
Hungary
No. 4 SIKOS T., Tam& (1987): Investigations of Social Infrastructure in Rural Settlements
of Borsod County
No. 5 HORVATH, Gyula (1987): Development of the Regional Management of the
Economy in East-Central Europe
No. 6 PALNE KOVACS, Ilona (1988): Chance of Local Independence in Hungary
No. 7 FARAGO, Laszlo — HRUBI, Laszlo (1988): Development Possibilities of Backward
Areas in Hungary
No. 8 SZORENYINE KUKORELLI, Iren (1990): Role of the Accessibility in Development
and Functioning of Settlements
No. 9 ENYEDI, Gyorgy (1990): New Basis for Regional and Urban Policies in East-Central
Europe
No. 10 RECHNITMR, Janos (1990): Regional Spread of Computer Technology in Hungary
No. 11 SIKOS T., Tunas (1992): Types of Social Infrastructure in Hungary (to be not
published)
No. 12 HORVATH, Gyula — HRUBI, Laszlo (1992): Restructuring and Regional Policy in
Hungary
No. 13 ERDOSI, Ferenc (1992): Transportation Effects on Spatial Structure of Hungary
No. 14 PALNE KOVACS, Ilona (1992): The Basic Political and Structural Problems in the
Workings of Local Governments in Hungary
No. 15 PFEIL, Edit (1992): Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional
Centre
No. 16 HORVATH, Gyula (1992): Culture and Urban Development (The Case of Pecs)
No. 17 HAJDU, Zoltan (1993): Settlement Network Development Policy in Hungary in the
Period of State Socialism (1949-1985)
No. 18 KOVACS, Ter& (1993): Borderland Situation as It Is Seen by a Sociologist
No. 19 HRUBI, L. — KRAFTNE SOMOGYI, Gabriella (eds.) (1994): Small and medium-
sized firms and the role of private industry in Hungary
No. 20 BENKONE Lodner, Dorottya (1995): The Legal-Administrative Questions of
Environmental Protection in the Republic of Hungary
No. 21 ENYEDI, Gyorgy (1998): Transformation in Central European Postsocialist Cities