Discussion Papers 1992. No. 15. 
Local Governments and System Change. 
The Case of a Regional Centre
CENTRE FOR REGIONAL STUDIES 
OF HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 
No. 15 
Local Governments and System Change. 
The Case of a Regional Centre 
by 
PFEIL, Edit 
Series editor 
HRUBI, Laszlo 
Pecs 
1992 

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Discussion Papers 1992. No. 15. 
Local Governments and System Change. 
The Case of a Regional Centre
The Discussion Papers series is sponsored by 
BAT Pecsi Dohanygyar Kft. 
a Member of the British-American Tobacco Company Group 
The research and publishing of this paper are sponsored by 
National Research Fund 
(OTKA) 
ISSN 0238-2008 
© 1992 by Centre for Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
Technical editor: Hrubi, Laszlo 
Typeset by Centre for Regional Studies, HAS 
Printed in Hungary by G—Nyomdasz Ltd., Pecs 

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Discussion Papers 1992. No. 15. 
Local Governments and System Change. 
The Case of a Regional Centre
CONTENTS 
Introduction (5) 
The first stage of the restructuring process: 
the local government elections (8) 
Characteristic features of the activity of representative body 
based on party-policies (11) 
Factions in the locality (17) 
The external relational network of the local governments (25) 
Conclusions (33) 
Notes (35) 
Bibliography (37) 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
INTRODUCTION 
In autumn 1990 — shortly after the parliamentary elections — through the 
election of the municipal representatives the establishment of the local 
government system in Hungary began. The present transitory period, in 
which the elements of the old and the new system still mingle, is accom-
panied by opposite views of politicians and academic experts. The latter 
ones in the interrelation of the change of regime, power and elite gener-
ally regard the present parties as mere transitory parties, in the existence 
and activity of which the paralysation of the society's interests is expressed, 
on the other hand, the change of power, which took place in 1990, only 
started the process of the change of regime, the real test of which will be 
the opposition coming into power in the future. Finally it is not of minor 
importance that the change of the elite which took place in 1989-1990 
only created the elite of the transition, so the appearance of professional 
politicians is still to be expected. 1  
All these elements with the characteristic feature of politics domi-
nating the events, even in the field of the economy, have their imprint on 
the urban and rural local governments' activity which are being formed pre-
sently. It is a fact that in the process of creating the constitutional state, 
the dictatorial state was replaced by a pluralistic power structure, but it 
also should be noticed that the change of power and elite failed to be 
complete because of the very results of the local government elections. 
That is, the majority of the local municipal representative bodies is libe-
ral, that is oppositionist as contrasted to the parties of the governing coa-
lition, or independent in smaller communities. Thus about half a year af-
ter the parliamentary elections the governing parties had to suffer a severe 
defeat on local level. It can be put in another point of view as well: the 
division of power occurred in a particular form, not in the separation of 
state powers, but in a broader, political sense. 
M. Bihari  rightly stated about the governing coalition after the lo-
cal authority elections that it started an attack against the whole society 2 
 including public administration, culture, mass media and young people.
2 
 It seems that the government wants the local governments to get into a 
subordinate position. 
After this general survey this paper undertakes the task of describ-
ing the new Hungarian local government system taking into account the 
problems of public administration and also local politics through an em-
pirical research which was mainly held in a large town. The approach is 
5 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
definitely that of with public administrative and legal aspect in view, which, 
however, makes it possible to analyse the circumstances in a broader sense 
as well. 
The empirical survey about the large town was carried out within 
the framework of the research financed by the  Hungarian Institute of Public 
Administration. 
After forty years of a centralised public administrative structure, 
the two cornerstones in the formation of the new Hungarian local govern-
ments are the local authority law and the electoral law, each of which is 
the result of a political compromise. 
The electoral law regulates two systems which are independent of 
each other. In towns and villages with less than 10,000 inhabitants the 
members of the municipal representative body had to be elected from a 
list on which all the candidates were indicated, and the ones who obtain-
ed most votes got into the body. The mayor in this case took his position 
through direct election. In contrast with it in communities with more than 
10,000 inhabitants which are in fact towns, half the members of the local 
governments got their seat in individual constituencies, while the other 
half were elected on a list base, where the seats of representatives are pro-
portionally divided between the different lists. In this category of towns 
the mayor is elected by the municipal representative body itself. 
As it is clear from the outlined facts this voting system does not at all 
guarantee the local government to be controlled by town-councillors who 
can work together harmoniously, or a political majority to be developed. 
It needs no explanation either that the legal regulation distinctly deter-
mined the party-based composition of the municipal representative bo-
dies in the towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants. It is supported by 
the results of the election, as barely 8% of all the elected representatives 
do not belong to parties, while in small communities the representatives 
are preponderantly independent (71%). 
In theoretical aspect the local level restructuring process was party-
spirited to a greater extent than in other East-European countries. A fur-
ther characteristic is that the establishment of party-pluralism and the de-
velopment of the local government system were linked together. Though 
western democracies as examples to follow are distinctly recognisable when 
defining the elements of the new-type local governments, other social or-
ganisations of the locality, which are very common there, are still miss-
ing in Hungary. This circumstance encouraged the parties to definitely 
undertake the values of self-government. The result of it did not fail to 
come about, as the Hungarian parties try to appear as the only factor of 
6 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
macropolitics, and they do this on the level of locality as well. Many people 
think that the civil society have not become so active as it was expected 
after the change of regime, in fact it has stiffened in paralysation as com-
pared to the last years of the so-called party-state: ,,... the former „defensive 
society" changed into a „defenceless society", as all the institutions and 
forms of activity which have been developed in the fight against state so-
cialism were made a complete write-off by the new regime, the cadres 
and energy were drew off, and it tried to forcefully subordinate the civil 
society."3  
7 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
THE FIRST STAGE OF THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS: 
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS 
The characteristics and problems mentioned in the introduction are set in 
a true light if we give details and analyse then through particular events. 
It obviously appears an arbitrary choice to analyse a particular town 
which is large in Hungarian relation when considering the entire local 
authority system. But in addition to the fact that with the help of this me-
thod we can get a reply to the nature of the common dysfunctions in the 
local governments mainly deriving from the legal regulation or absence 
of regulation, we also have to deal with an urban category which makes it 
possible to learn about party-like local government activity, on which le-
vel formalised mechanism cannot be replaced by interpersonal relations. 
(Though complete ousting of the latter ones are certainly unthinkable.) 
The Hungarian self-government law which took effect in 1990 in-
stitutionalised a somewhat contradictory local government structure, which 
definitely resulted from the rejection of the previous council system. 4  On 
one hand, the legislators sustained the previous two-level public adminis-
tration by placing the official second instance to a deconcentrated unit with 
legality supervisory, that is general jurisdiction, which has no roots in 
Hungary, thus taking it out from the local governments' scope of author-
ity. On the other hand, the law recognises only one type of self-govern-
ment, namely the local government, as a consequence of which all the re-
gional constitutional bodies are equal. There is no hierarchical relation 
between the community, the town, the capital city and its surrounding 
(suburban) zone and the county's local government, though this latter 
one is a historical category, which is more than a 1000 years old, and 
which is also a pillar of the state regional division according to the con-
stitution. • 
Legislators themselves were compelled to solve this contradictory 
situation. They stated that the local governments of towns, villages and 
counties may have different duties and scopes of authority. In fact, the coun-
ty was regulated as services providing, the  differentia specifica  of which 
is that it is obliged to do all the duties which are prescribed by the law and 
which cannot be done by the local governments of towns and villages be-
cause of their limited capacity. 
This short detour was necessary because the object of our empirical 
examination is a Hungarian town which is also a county centre and a city 
with regional functions. The expression  large town is proper in the Hun- 
8 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
garian situation, as it is a town with nearly 170,000 inhabitants. Our town 
has the law of county (it is so-called  city with county status),  which can 
be given by the Parliament after judging separately to towns with more 
than 50,000 inhabitants. These latter ones though declared as local govern-
ments by statute, they are taken out from the whole of the local authority 
system. It casts the county's scope of duties and authority which occur in 
their area to their own scope of authority. This fundamental regulatory 
principle is advantageous in the sense that the city with county status 
which has high-level services organisation function becomes equal with 
its own county, but it is disadvantageous when independence takes the 
shape of isolation. 
Without prejudging we would like to state here, that there is no in-
stitutional relation between the county as an regional level and the city 
which is its centre and the authority of which covers the whole county, 
even exceeds it. 
Not moving away from the general concerns of the Hungarian self-
government system, it is worth dwelling at the municipal elections, which 
are the first step in the restructuring process. In autumn 1990 in addition 
to 7 parties six social organisations figured publicly in our town, as they 
set up candidates in the local government elections. As we know, legal 
regulations favoured the parties, each of them had lists as well, while two 
of the six civil organisations were able to set up only individual candi-
dates. 
Civil society presented a hopeful picture at that time. For example, 
the chamber gathering librarians' and adult educators' associations stepped 
forward with the program of a civilised society on the basis of the town's 
cultural traditions; another group aimed at complex social, cultural and 
youth policy, while the local greens set the objective of environment pro-
tection. All of them are strongly marked election programs in contrast to 
parties which had no programs. The canvassing of the latter ones mainly 
relied on the general program of the national party-centre, which ob-
viously was inadequate concerning the fate of the local governments, and 
they only outlined their point of view in some town issues which they 
thought were topical. 
And the voters voted, though it was not clear what in fact they 
would get in return for their vote, since on the eve of the change of elite 
even the names of the candidates sounded unfamiliar to them. It is un-
deniable that disappointment of people in national politics and in the change 
of the regime, the experience of catharsis which failed to come about al-
so cast a shadow on the local government elections. Because of the low 
9 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
turnout there were two turns of municipal elections in every town with 
more than 10,000 inhabitants. In „N" (let's call our town like that) parti-
cipation was 30.2% in the first turn. At the second time there was even 
less interest among the citizens, however, according to the electoral law, 
this turn was valid. 
In „N" everything happened like in most Hungarian towns, and the 
new municipal body is made up of city-councillors, who are without ex-
ception members of a party, or supported by a party. The parties of the go-
verning coalition suffered a defeat here too, while the two liberal parties 
(the Free Democrats and the Young Democrats) obtained majority by 
winning 59% of the seats. Finally, the successors of the state-party which 
was divided into two obtained two and one seats, respectively. 
What happened could also be called a party coup, as from among the 
172 candidates the 25 independent candidates' efforts were unsuccessful, 
neither they nor the candidates of the civil organisations had the voters' 
confidence, though they were not less talented or ill-equipped or less po-
sitioned than the ones who were elected. It can be explained by the fact 
that over a certain size of towns (definitely in the case of a large town) 
knowing somebody personally does not influence the voters' behaviour. 
Thus, in the case of missing direct information the party the candidates 
belong to and the political colour provide essential footing. In Hungarian 
relation, the results of the parliamentary elections which were held half a 
year earlier and well-remembered by people .  as well as the performance 
of the parties served as information in the course of the local government 
elections. 
10 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF THE ACTIVITY OF 
REPRESENTETIVE BODY BASED ON PARTY-POLICY 
In the case of the Hungarian local governments the establishment of local 
government institutions and the definition of the policies of party-like ac-
tivity were interlinked. 
In „N" the mayor and the deputy mayors were elected as well as the 
special committees formed already at the statutory meeting. The mayor 
obtained his post as the candidate of the Party of Free Democrats which had 
most seats, but he was not elected from the body members, but making 
use of the opportunity provided by the local authority law he was dele-
gated from outside. Thus with him the number of liberal town-council-
lors increased automatically by one. 
The Hungarian local government system — following the pattern of 
western democracies and breaking with the legacy of the former socialist 
council system — stresses the importance of the work done in the commit-
tees. The municipal body defines its own committee organisation meeting in 
fact one restriction. That is, it is obligatory to form a financial superviso-
ry committee in each town with more than 2,000 inhabitants. Experience 
proves that spontaneous control prevails in this type of committee, that is 
why it is under the influence of the opposition within the committee. 
There have been no acts passed yet which would prescribe setting 
up further committees compulsorily. In our town the following commit-
tees started to work in the spirit of freedom ensured by law concerning 
the setting up of organisations: 
— legal and steering committee, 
—health committee, 
—economic and enterprise committee, 
— environmental and urban planning committee, 
— transport and communal services committee, 
— educational and sport committee, 
— cultural committee. 
Unfortunately, this structure of the committees does not match the 
organisational proportions of the apparatus set up later and which would 
be essential in efficient co-operation. On the other hand, the division of 
labour between the committees is not clear, though there is some over-
lapping indicated from the outline, and there is also a missing. committee 
which would co-ordinate the others' work. 
11 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
This lack of organisation cannot obviously be put down exclusively 
to the newly elected elite's account who are not yet experienced enough 
in public administration. Experts agree that legislators who defined regu-
latory enactments were too liberal in many respects, which, on one hand, 
can be understood as a counter-effect of the dictatorship, but, on the other 
hand, it keeps local governments in the state of uncertainty in many as-
pects. 
Neither the section of the Constitution dealing with local govern-
ments, nor the local government law itself mention parties. So when re-
gulating the party-policy activity the councillors can do as they think best. In 
this aspect it seems natural that Hungarian local governments took over 
the parliamentary model, they set up their rules and regulations as standing 
orders. This method itself cannot be disapproved because international 
special literature recognises for example the local government commit-
tees as representative organs, which can derive their rights from an organ 
which is a representative body too, in our case from the body of the mem-
bers of the Parliament. And it is also added that this definition is taken 
from the parliamentary law. But it is assailable that the institution of the 
committee as well as the whole local government activity is subordinated 
to party-policy interests without any counterbalancing guarantees (for exam-
ple the protection of minorities). 
In „N", and in other towns as well the individuals forming a com-
mittee reflect the parties' power relations, particularly the allotment of 
chairman's posts in the committees was very important. In our sample 
the opposition got the leading post in the Health Committee which is of 
minor importance in the present situation. Anyway, it is not common in 
Hungary that the mayor holds the post of chairman in a committee. 
With regard to other countries' practice, that legal proposition is not a 
novelty according to which: „It is reasonable to elect into the committee 
the representatives of significant organisations which run relevant ser-
vices and the delegates of social organisations, and other electors who 
use the services." 5  
A restriction is applied to it: the chairman and more than half of the 
committee members should be elected of councillors, and this can be 
approved of. But this rule is applied in a considerable number of local 
governments in such a manner that the committee members who are not 
town-councillors do not possess equal rights, as they are present in an 
advisory and not voting capacity. It is the case notwithstanding the fact 
that the committees make use of the opportunity to invite outside experts, 
but they do everything that interests and values which threaten the domi- 
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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
nance of party interests could not in the end appear in the local govern-
ment decisions. In it one of the methods which can alienate the local agent 
and local government activity is recognised, though the renewing legiti-
macy of the municipal body can be expected from it from time to time. It 
is enough to turn for explanation to our sample. 
Leaders of „N" city give reasons about the application of this orga-
nisational principle, saying that only in this way the balance of political 
forces within the committees can be ensured, that is, if the outside mem-
bers possessed full rights then a devastating fight would start so that each 
party put the experts who are committed to them into the committees. 
Such means of minority protection — which among other countries 
— works pretty well in the Federal Republic of Germany evidently does 
not fit into the above mentioned conception. According to it those fac-
tions which because they are few in numbers cannot delegate members 
into a committee, have the right to delegate an assistant member with ad-
visory right into the relevant committee. This rule makes it obvious that 
Hungarian legal practice in contrast to the positive discrimination in 
western democracies is still inclined to negative discrimination against 
the political opposition. 
It is common knowledge that local level committees have the pri-
mary role of releasing the municipal body and quickening the decision-
making process. This latter function which covers the examination of 
considerations which should be taken into account in the course of 
municipal decisions and the presentation of propositions essential to the 
decision is in principle realised in Hungary, as most of the agenda is set 
before the municipal sessions by the committees and it only rarely falls 
to the apparatus. 
The distinction „in principle" is necessary to make because as I 
have mentioned the towns' municipal representative bodies act as „small 
parliaments". Thanks to the Legal and Steering Orders Committee an a-
genda proposition is prepared for every body session, still the topics of the 
session are made up incidentally, as it is common to have speeches tak-
ing a long time before proceeding to the agenda and to real work. More-
over, at such times almost without exception the town-councillors have 
to cope with motions which are submitted as urgent. 
The trouble is that institutions borrowed from the parliament and 
also found in the organisational and operational rules are alien from the 
locality. Let's consider the notion of self-government, or communal poli-
cy as it is called in the German-speaking countries.  H-G. Wehling  puts it that 
communal policy is essentially social policy, and through this it forms 
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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
human co-existence, which — though in different ways and intensity in 
the different communities — directly reacts to social claims. Its political 
character can be grasped at that we always deal with politics if decision 
must be made between alternatives alongside particular interests. In 
short, it is not the construction of roads in general sense that is decided a-
bout in the city hall, but a precisely defined road-building project. 6  
Since in this field different individual and group interests are con-
cerned no local government can decide about urgent motions of individ-
ual representatives which are put forward in speech and which lack the 
careful preparation by the committees and the apparatus linked to them. 
However, these  ad hoc  constrained decisions in practice often oust the 
professionally and politically well-founded agenda. 
Back to our clue we must state that in Hungarian relation it is only 
partially true that the committees release the municipal representative 
body, though its legal conditions are given. It means, on one hand, 
according to relevant orders that the committees in addition to the 
preparation of decisions also organise and control their execution. On the 
other hand, with respect to jurisdiction which cannot be relegated, the 
municipal representative body is entitled to give the right of decision to 
its committees and state an official scope of authority for them. 
Surprisingly, in „N" there was no shift in any direction. Leaders of 
the town, first of all the mayor and the two deputy mayors, shoulder an 
unbelievable burden of work in order to preserve the power extensively 
concentrated. Its ideological basis is the misunderstood interpretation of 
the theory on the division of powers. 
It is common knowledge that in the local government systems, in 
which committees work actively the legislative and the executive roles of 
the local constitutional representative body cannot distinctly be sepa-
rated. It is confirmed by the model of the strong mayor in the Hungarian 
system, according to which the first leader is not only the chairman of the 
representative body but also the head of the apparatus. Contrary to the 
outlined facts in our town the committees and through them the members 
as well are excluded from the executive and supervisory activity, though 
in the organisational rules the framework of it is given. The position of 
the alderman unfortunately does not work in practice, which would give 
the opportunity for the committee chairmen to supervise the work of the 
official organisational unit in their venue, thus guaranteeing the quality 
execution of the decisions. 
So, at this point the character of the parliamentary and the local 
government work is distinctly separated, since the latter one differently 
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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
from the legislative power allows to influence public administration di-
rectly. In contrast to it in the site of our examination a strange approach 
prevails, according to which the spheres of the committees and the appa-
ratus with regard to execution cannot mingle, only one of the officials 
can be the link between them. That is, the chairmen of the committees 
cannot hold a quasi official organisational unit leader's position. 
It needs no explanation that in this case the classical theory of the 
division of powers was adapted to local government relations, although 
in this field separation of the responsibility for decisions and execution is 
impossible. The direct consequence of the misinterpretation is that apart 
from the mandatory place and role which the municipal representative 
body has, every part of the activity: work in the committees, entire super-
vision of the apparatus, execution and its supervision, etc. definitely con-
centrates in the hands of the three leading officials (the mayor and the 
two deputy mayors). All these arouse the feeling of absolute centralisa-
tion. 
The conclusion of Paine Kovacs, I.  may be right here, in it the opi-
nion of many people is expressed: „After the local government elections 
- since the parliamentary results do not reflect the parliamentary power 
relations - the fight between the government and the opposition parties 
extended to the local government activity as well. So no party can in-
dulge in the luxury of letting their local organisations completely free, or 
not to have high political ambitions." 7  
Though the party-policy character of the local government has not 
yet been examined, I think all the enumerated anomalies indirectly origi-
nate in this focus which is a stiffened conflict. 
Another tool of releasing the municipal representative body and al-
so the quickening of the decision-making procedure - for the citizens - is 
the delegation of part of the decisions to the committees. It can be done with 
regard to other countries' practice in single assignments, or by means of 
a general clause but under different conditions. At some places only over 
a certain population it is allowed to transfer rights, at other places only 
the most important committee can be delegated with authority. Further 
guarantees can be built in, by means of which the committee decisions 
and the whole of the local government policy can subsequently be co-
ordinated if necessary. Decisions can be changed or annulled until they 
infringe the acquired rights of third persons. 
In Hungarian relation apart from the scopes of authority which are 
defined one by one in the law and cannot be transferred nothing sets lim- 
its for our local governments to divide labour. In spite of the fact that the 
15 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
municipal representative bodies often cannot work because of their over-
operativeness they rigidly stick to all of their authority. The committees, 
however, initiated in several cases the transfer of decision competence in 
our town too, but all the time they met rigid refusal. On the whole two 
committees, the Economic and Enterprise Committee and the Cultural 
Committee managed to acquire the right of decision in some issues. 
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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
FACTIONS IN THE LOCALITY 
Supposedly there is a fear in the refusal of decentralisation that decisions 
made in the committees do not completely reflect the parties' power rela-
tions which characterise the general assembly. At the same time the 
speeches of the members in the assembly reveal the judgement on the re-
lation of factions and the different committees. In short, the member of a 
committee represents his whole faction, so if he expresses his private 
opinion them there is no sense in the work of the committee. That is, rep-
resentatives of factions take part in the sessions so that they could inform 
the parties about the happenings. 
The facts described in the introduction are striking, as they are 
some of the most significant features in the reviving of the local govern-
ments after 40 years. As we know local governments having parliamen-
tary features is a fairly new phenomenon all over the world. Which in 
turn reveals that we should finish with the assumption that the commu-
nity gives free scope to citizens in their relation to public administration, 
or that the community could be defined as a closed living community, 
since modem democracy manifests itself by the presence of parties. Of 
course there are positive and negative approaches to the process of the 
parties domination in the locality. The latter ones for example regard the 
essence of factions as gaps or insufficiency in the beneficial net of the 
democratic constitutional state. But others emphasise in the process of 
dominating parliamentarism that it prevents the communities to sink to 
the level of mere bureaucratic units. With the help of the parties they are 
enabled to preserve their democratic island-like character within the 
whole of the state. 
Without going into details about the advantages and disadvantages 
of party-dominated local governments, let's survey the Hungarian prac-
tice compared to the German federal provinces. This time only practice can 
really be dealt with, since Hungary has only presently got into the state 
which western democracies underwent about 10 years ago. There are no 
statutory rules concerning the activity of factions, though they cannot be 
ignored. Due to this reason local governments set up the rules of the 
game, which leaves much to be desired. 
The criteria of forming a faction is minimally 3 members in the 
town under examination. This principle which is recorded in the organ-
isational rules automatically excludes from forming factions and the at-
tendant rights the socialist and the communist parties, which have two 
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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
and one town-councillors, respectively. The Federal Republic of Germa-
ny sets an example with reversed values, where in several provinces two 
members are the minimum to form a faction. Even one-member faction 
is known in Hessen, Baden-WUrttemberg, Bavaria, Rhine-Pfalz, Bremer-
haven. That is, one town-councillor can be regarded as a faction, if there 
is no other representative of his party or electoral group in the municipal 
representative body. This kind of faction status is an exception, but it is 
by no means anticonstitutional, as it can be derived from the tool of 
minority protection. The most severe requirement in this relation to be 
met is giving the parties equal chances, which should be extended to 
electoral groups, too. 
The basic principle which is named as „free mandate" in the Ger-
man Supreme Law has not yet been built in the Hungarian constitutional 
law. According to the principle it is not allowed to make the committee 
work of the councillors which anyway decisively rests upon the activity 
of the faction dependant of which party they belong to and through this 
allow a determinant influence of the parties on the factions and individ-
ual councillors. Consequently those who belong to factions have their 
own free will, too. If it was not like that then the parties through their 
centralised controlling mechanism would empty the local government. 
Unfortunately the danger of it is quite big in Hungary, which was 
given voice to in „N" by the Christian Democratic councillors. The 
members of this party worked in the joint faction of the governing coalit-
ion parties for some months, then in the general assembly and also as an 
open letter in the local newspaper announced their separation in order to 
form an independent faction. The reasons are fairly illuminating, as the 
statement disapproved of the fact that the general assembly was the place 
where the parties fight for power, while the interests of the town are 
pushed into the background. The formation of the independent faction is 
meant to maintain the moral character of the Christian Democratic Peo-
ple's Party and to ensure the freedom of representation for the represen-
tatives — the statement says. 
In short, some of the councillors distinctly require the protection of 
minorities and the right of the freely expressed opinion. But behind this 
there is the widely spread misapprehension, which was put by the leader 
of one of the factions. According to his standpoint every party in the lo-
cal government follows its own policy, since no member can change his 
opinion announced during the electoral campaign. Otherwise he would 
commit ethical offence against his constituents. As to voting he divides 
the issues under consideration into two categories: either the issue is not 
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Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
of party-policy significance and it is possible to vote differently, or it is 
an issue of policies in political aspect then because of the responsibility 
towards the constituents it allows only uniform voting for those who be-
long to the same party. 
The issue of belonging to parties in towns with more than 10,000 
inhabitants has a distinctive role in every section of local government ac-
tivity. To put it more sharply: the most determinant feature of the repre-
sentatives is their belonging to a certain party or faction. In small com-
munities where parties have gained ground in a less extent this is replac-
ed by permanent confrontation between the new representatives and the 
old representatives who had been elected before the change of regime. It 
is proved by the institutions and structures which have already been es-
tablished in this short period. It is an accepted fact that at the sessions of 
the local government only the decisions which are taken in a political sense 
are made. 
Decisions which are taken in a sociological sense are made with the 
public not admitted, so to say behind the scenes. In decision-making as-
pect the discussions of the faction leaders at this point become important, 
the framework of which for example is given in the organisational and 
operational rules in „N". This conciliation board in fact meets officially 
on the motion of the mayor or the chairman of the Legal and Steering 
Committee. In addition to this it is legally given for a professional con-
ciliation forum to act. However, this so-called small assembly probably 
due to lack of claim does not exist. Though this form would guarantee 
the co-ordination of the activities of the mayor, the two deputy mayors, 
the chairmen of the standing committees, the presently non-existing al-
dermen, and the notaries who thus would get into permanent work con-
tact. 
A further outcome of the problem is that professionality is definite-
ly pushed into the background by political matters in the present Hunga-
rian local governments. Complex propositions of great importance con-
cerning the town are almost without exception set before the general as-
sembly in the form of motions made by factions. That is, proposals al-
ways have the name of a party at their headings. 
A concomitant sign of these faction motions is that the parties when 
working them out do not make use of the expertise of the apparatus, so 
they are discussed without professional control. A further difficulty in 
the sorting out of the problem is that the small groups of national parties 
— as a sign of their weakness — cannot rely on advisors similar to experts 
who help MPs with their work. 
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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
It is dangerous, because representatives often do not see the legal, 
economic or other limits of the issue, which can lead to unlawful resolu-
tions. 
The statements mentioned so far have already foreshadowed a not 
very benign phenomenon, namely, that the relationship between the ap-
paratus and the local government office is often troublesome in the new 
Hungarian local governments. The town-councillors acknowledged the 
expertise of the apparatus extremely slowly and only gradually. There 
are at least two important factors in its background. On one hand, they 
have to work with an apparatus inherited from the dictatorial period, the 
expertise of which can hardly be questioned. At the same time the new 
town-leading elite have no skills in public administration at all, which re-
sults in facing inability, which is painful for everyone. Since the dis-
missal of the apparatus was out of question, as there is no other specialist 
staff in the present situation, conflicts have only deepened. The ambitious 
committees try to control the activity of the office units, while some of them 
do not rely on the work of the apparatus at all. 
This relationship which cannot be called smooth at all have for 
months been burdened with the intense uncertainty, which was caused by 
the long delay of organisational modernisation. It is no wonder that this cir-
cumstance had an effect on the morals of the office workers and caused 
the turnover of highly qualified workers. 
The revealed operational anomalies seem to support our hypothe-
sis. The specific features of local government policy do not allow to ap-
ply mechanically the rules of high politics, because it causes disadvan-
tages for the local community. 
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Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLICITY 
I would like just to remind that publicity is the fundamental organising prin-
ciple of a political structure, and any political power exists only through 
publicity. And if we regard self-government as an organising principle, 
then we must see that it gives great opportunity for the decision-maker to 
involve the interests and experience of the local community into the pro-
cess of decision-making. Really it is not only an issue of freedom, but al-
so an important tool in the renewal of legitimacy at the same time. 
It is unquestionable that the main factor of local politics is the local 
government, but not exclusively. Many organisations of the civil society 
should be its alliance in addition to parties, and it is a precondition for 
optimal decisions. The question which must be answered is how non-par-
ty-policy interests, views, opinions are channelled into local government 
activity. It is a touchy point in the Hungarian local governments with party-
based functioning, since in big towns the effect of „everyone knows eve-
ryone" and its information circulating influence does not work. 
The parties in the local governments claim to monopolistic power 
which is working out very clearly in the city under examination. To put 
it briefly, there is no living relationship between the town and its leaders. 
Civil social organisations spring up like mushrooms — to fill in the 
previous gap —, and as, on one hand, struggle with the difficulties of for-
mation, and, on the other hand, representing one or two interest groups 
they logically get involved in the activity of the local government, they one 
after the other knock at the gate of the city hall. The town-councillors de-
finitely refuse to co-operate with them or support them, so we must sup-
pose they do not recognise their own interests. There has been no such 
case when any civil group could take part or have any influence on the 
preparatory procedure of decisions in which they are concerned. This state-
ment is also true with the committees which do most of the preparation 
of decisions. For there — in the outlined way — when involving lay per-
sons professional quality is emphasised and not the variety of interests. It 
is necessary to underline at least two of the harmful effects. One is the 
danger of decisions to be deformed, and the fact that if civil social orga-
nisations cannot fulfil their function, that is cannot influence decisions, 
they will surely wither away. 
The direct link between the constituents and the local government 
hangs on two rather weak threads. One is the consulting hours of the rep-
resentatives elected in individual constituencies which is held more or less 
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Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
regularly, the other is public audition which was institutionalised by the self-
government law. The latter one is not very popular either, not from either 
side. The municipal representative body of „N" has invited the citizens of 
the town to meet personally only once a year so far (it is the minimum regu-
lated by the law), and only few of them have paid their respect at the session. 
Unfortunately, these forms of maintaining relations themselves are not 
sufficient in collecting information necessary for decision-making. This 
situation cannot be helped by the rarely and only in important issues used 
tool of the local referendum or people's motion. 
It is a matter of judgement whether we regard the system of relations 
between the municipal representative body and the citizens who make up 
the community as the internal affair of the local government or as some-
thing belonging to the external relational network. Apart from the sorting 
out of this problem the recognition of the relative independence of the 
part-areas of towns and villages should be attached great importance to. 
Towns, certain villages all over the world have such parts, resort areas, 
housing estates, etc. which in spite of close ties to the core area form a 
community which has specific features and claims to relative independence. 
This statement is especially true with a large town, which in addi-
tion to reflecting the segregation of the inhabitants in the different dis-
tricts, through its growth also incorporated some of the suburban villages. 
The Hungarian local authority law — trying to keep up with west-
ern-European partners — allows to set up part-area self-governments of parts 
(dictricts) of towns, though the regulations are inaccurate and inconsistent. 
Due to this, the plans for setting up pat-are self-governments in the towns 
are accompanied with scandals, since nobody knows how and who can 
found it. 
It cannot be explained merely by the confused situation why the towns 
with county status — with exception one town — keep aloof from this self-
government variant. The law states special rules for them, because it allows 
them to set up districts, and district offices within them. After that the mu-
nicipal representative body of the town with county status is entitled to set 
up a district municipal body of representatives elected in the already existing 
district. 
Unfortunately, legislators have not stated any objective legal ground 
or criteria concerning the setting up of part-area (district) self-governments 
in large towns, so the matter of district self-gevernment is exposed to the 
subjective judgement of the municipal representative body which is un-
der extreme influence of the parties. For example, the leaders of our city 
are not inclined to recognise the traditional partial independence of cer- 
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Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
taro districts which is based on their specific interests. In the background of 
this behaviour there is a fear of a possible power division within the town, 
since the district municipal representative body is a legal entity, too, and 
certain decisions and financial resources have to be guaranteed to it. The 
setting up of a part-area self-government is most risky because it is unforsee-
able which party will dominate in a particular district representative body. 
The part-area self-government — which is at present surrounded by a-
version because of partial interests — could be an efficient form in the explo-
ration and handling of local problems, in getting to know the opinions of 
the citizens' groups, in a word to grasp interests which are outside the party 
sphere. 
Another field concerning our topic is the relationship between the 
local press and the local government, since local and regional dailies are 
efficient tools of forming the public opinion. Perhaps it is not a single case —
let's think of macropolitics, more exactly the relationship between the go-
vernment and the press mentioned already in the introduction — that the re-
lationship between the local daily and the local government has deeply wor-
sened. The representatives often objected to the fact that the press did not or 
not in the expected colouring or angle show the activity of the local govern-
ment to the readers, though it hardly could be denied that covers were re-
gular and the regulations, statements concerning the residents were reported. 
Finally, as a consequence upon some incomprehensible offended-
ness things have come to a head. The general assembly passed a resolu-
tion on the municipal representative body to make an agreement with one 
of the local commercial newspapers for a year on the following: it reports in 
about one page per paper the regulations, resolutions, other information 
of the local government, moreover it makes reports about individual rep-
resentatives. The argument was that since every family in „N" gets this 
paper every week free of charge, through it wide-spread information can 
be guaranteed. The body of representatives seems to be satisfied with this 
form because the agreement has been extended from time to time. 
Conclusions can be summed up in the following way: facts discuss-
ed in this chapter are also the concomitant signs of party-policy based lo-
cal government activity, where party policy got the upper hand over the 
goals of the local government. 
As experience proves such local governments do not try to get to 
know the opinion of the civil society and of the different interest groups, 
that is why they handle their task with a sort of omnipotential. They think 
that the confidence they received from their constituents is once and for 
all absolute and irrevocable. 
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Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
Due to the fact that they are not in touch with the citizens they are 
not concerned with the development of an attitude which would handle 
the problems specifically to layers or districts, not to mention the draw-
ing up of a tinged urban policy. 
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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
THE EXTERNAL RELATION NETWORK OF THE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
The local government in its existence is linked to the locality, but the in-
tensity of the engagement in outward politics is extremely important in 
its life. The parties can enforce local governments' points of view, and 
interests not only through their national centre, but the different local go-
vernment associations prove efficient channels, too. For example, in Italy 
they are markedly organised respectively to party affiliation. The estab-
lishment of local government interest associations did not have to be long 
waited for, and this was also beneficially encouraged by the local author-
ity law. 
In the middle of 1990 in Hungary 16 such associations have already 
appeared, only half of which is linked to a certain region or geographical 
landscape. The rest declared for themselves to represent local govern-
ment interests on a national level, which lead to inevitable parallelisms. 
Among other things several associations simultaneously claimed to re-
present urban and rural local governments against the central govern-
ment. This raises serious problems when exercising the legal rights: „Na-
tional interest associations of the local governments express their opinion 
on the statutory provisions concerning the local government and other 
draft state decisions. The organ making central decisions must be inform-
ed about the standpoint of the associations  ".8  
As a result of lack of the necessary co-operation and co-ordination 
between the associations, the government and the relevant parliamentary 
committee in some for the local governments important decisions failed 
to perform their legal duty owing to lack of the right negotiating partner. 
So, on one hand, the divided associations and the obscurity of regulation, 
on the other hand, hinder the high level utterance of local government 
interests. It does not turn out from the legal formulation how the 
associations get involved in the process of legislation, .in addition to the 
fact that the rights which they are entitled to are rather powerless (for 
example, the right of the expression of their opinion). 
The plentifulness of the associations does not make it evident that 
each local government joins one of them: about the half of local govern-
ments are out of these associations. At the general assembly in „N" it 
was put on the agenda to join the association of large towns, but the issue 
was definitely refused by the town-councillors. Due to this the town was 
at a disadvantage in regard to the enforcement of its interests as well as 
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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
access to essential information, because the Ministry of the Interior pro-
vided information to the different associations. This latter fact is disap-
proved by local leaders as well as the fact that the associations try to es-
tablish independent organisations, to create independent regulation, to 
swell their own apparatus. From the experience of the past period the fi-
nal conclusions resulted in the reconsideration of the previous decision of 
the representative body, as it is undeniable that the outside position blocks 
the town from a possible channel of local government politics. 
Like all local governments „N" also lives in a particular place, 
which puts the town into a specific relation network. So another segment 
of local government politics is given by the structure of the relations 
between „N" and its surroundings. 
If we have a look at the map of the county — the centre of which is 
„N"— it turns out that there is much less freedom for planning than we 
would expect, as the town has a predominant role in the whole of the 
county. The population of this town with county status makes up 41% of 
the total population in the county. 16 towns and villages of the narrow 
ring around „N" make up a further 10%, and it can be stated about a 
further 40 communities that they come under the gravitation of this large 
town, which is the so-called outer ring. That is, the town „N" has the 
feature of a general centre (gravity zone, county and regional centre). 
In reality, the town's local government do not even make an at-
tempt to influence or direct the relations which arise from provision and 
employment functions with the suburban towns and villages. It is enough 
to mention primary and secondary education, in the framework of which 
1,200 children from about 70 towns and villages (among them there are 
some from other counties) commute to „N''to school annually. The town 
with county status does not have to rely on the suburban communities' 
help, not even financially, since the latest financial regulations allocated 
the normative state subsidy to that local .  government which supports the 
school. So the town turns to the concerned local government only in par-
ticular matters and in certain cases. 
In the first year — for example —'the names of only two suburban 
villages turned up in the records. One of the requests was that the waste 
dump in „N" became small, so its territory needed enlargement. So the 
Environmental and Town Planning Committee turned to the relevant 
community in order to get their assent. The leaders of the community put 
the matter before the village assembly, where the residents gave their 
blessing on the matter under certain conditions to be fulfilled. 
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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
At the root of the problem is the fact that the new Hungarian local 
government system is built on about 3,000 autonomous units, which are 
not duely encouraged to integrate. Moreover, certain financial viewpoints, 
the unlimitedness of free undertaking of tasks directly stimulate them to 
obtain more and more institutions and tasks. In this way interests are 
completely divided. The so-called town surroundings (as units of former 
public administration system) which were criticised so much ceased to 
exist de jure, while the gravity zones of towns broke up  de facto  as wel1. 9 
 For the towns and suburban villages are not made to be interested in the 
co-operation, in the maintenance of living relations. 
Unless we regard as an incentive the legislative intention which 
trusting the ground up organisation of local governments' co-operation 
vested the municipal representative bodies with practically unlimited free-
dom of association, which is almost unprecedented in international com-
parison. As the local governments seem to have failed short of the expec-
tations in this field, opinions from responsible quarters were revealed, 
according to which there is a prospect of state interference to make re-
gional integration to be more dynamic. 
In local government politics the relationship between the county 
and the town with county status cannot be ignored. As it was mentioned 
in the introduction, the legislators trying to keep the county in a com-
pletely uncertain position created the county with subsidiary function. 
Those tasks have to be performed by the county local governments 
which urban and rural local governments cannot or do not want to per-
form. As a result of it the scope and role of the county local government 
depend on to which extent urban and rural local governments of the re-
gion retained or claim to territorial provision functions from the county. 
Finally, the importance of the county depends on what regional and gra-
vity zone ambitions the towns with county status have. 
The relationship between the local government of a large town and 
the county is usually not well-balanced, mainly if the previous one has the 
county status. Their rivalling is not new, though it would be definitely 
more advantageous for the citizens if the local government units recog-
nised their interdependence based on equality. Many rightly think that at 
the root of the problem is the legal regulation itself. The legislator insti-
tutionalised the conflict between the county and the town with county 
status. 
Two potential public administrative units with regional scope of acti-
vity work isolated from each other since they are not represented in each 
other's bodies. 
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Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
The central government's standpoint as against it seemingly sup-
ports most complete interest enforcement of local governments. In reality 
it is much less constructive, since it leads to interests to be divided. „In 
the cities interests of urban electors can be enforced, and in the counties, 
the villages and small towns — not subordinated to big cities — can en-
force their special provision claims which are beyond their essential 
functions. In the county representative body of small local governments 
that is in the general assembly the towns with more than 50,000 
inhabitants are not represented. So it is guaranteed that the regional and 
micro-zone interests of the big cities and the smaller settlements indepen-
dently appear in the relevant local governments, not subordinating each 
other." 1u For the time being there is no institutionalised framework to 
solve the problem, but it can be a feasible arrangement if the two (i.e., 
county-seat municipal and county) bodies of representatives are perma-
nently represented at each other's sessions with the goal of mutual infor-
mation. However, no such co-ordination was brought about neither with 
regard to common interests nor to benefits given by task division between 
the relevant local government units. 
In the town under survey we have come to the same conclusion, 
though here the county initiated to create such links. The leaders of the 
town responded with refusal, though it was already an open secret at that 
time, that the large town is concerned with the take-over of some public 
institutions which are maintained by the county but located in the town 
with county status and are mainly for the service of the town's inhabi-
tants. 
Legal framework for this is given, but its practical reasons deserve 
attention. For the goal of the large town is ousting the county from „N" 
referring to the following: the county local government should not have 
any properties or profit-making public institutions within the territory of 
a municipal local government which is taken out from the scope of the 
county authority. 
Although it can be stated that the principle of divide et impera  won, 
which was supposedly enforced by the legislators, nevertheless it can be 
recommended that the two types of local government should co-operate 
based on partnership even without any public law links. The reason is at 
least twofold. On one hand, it is to be found in the regional development, 
regional politics, and in provision organisation, on the other hand. While 
the first problem will be analysed later, with the latter one it should be 
taken into account that Hungarian public administration through the local 
government system fell into its smallest pieces, namely to towns and vil- 
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Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
lages. At the same time legal statutes concerning provision-organisation 
are fairly liberal. The dividing lines between the authority of the towns, 
villages and that of the counties are obscure, that is why such setting of 
tasks is incomprehensible in which all the tasks that the towns' and vil-
lages' local government cannot be compelled to do lodges to the county. 
But this latter category is not defined or closed by the law. 
Putting the question into another light: it is a widely known fact that 
due to the ever increasing claims of the consumer society only a rather li-
mited range of the local government service functions can be met within 
the boundaries of a particular local government of town or village. But 
according to Hungarian legal regulations — as I have mentioned it — in a 
model which is being formed ground up only local governments can ini-
tiate communal co-operation, foundation of partnerships. Due to this, there 
is a real risk for a part of the regional-type supply organisation tasks remain 
unappropriated. For the time being the county and in co-operation with it 
the town with county status which is also a gravitation centre, with even 
a regional scope can have a dominant role in filling the vacuum in this 
field, most of all in the elimination of uneven, uneconomical and unpro-
fessional performance of tasks. 
One of the guarantees in the protection of local interests, in short in 
the preservation of autonomy is the mentioned „foreign affairs". Among 
its elements the relationship with the central, or superior authority, the 
established negotiating position with it cannot be neglected. In this res-
pect special attention should be paid in the Hungarian public administra-
tive system to the new, non-traditional organ which was created to con-
trol legality in the local governments. The institution of the Comissioner 
of the Republic — taken out from its original public law environment —
undeniably follows the French pattern. In the background of its introduc-
tion there is a political compromise again. In the centre of the dispute 
there was repeatedly the county. 
Those who supported the conception of the local government to be 
an independent power branch, wanted to create a system which is based on 
the free association of urban and rural local governinents, instead of the 
county local government. According to this the organ for exercising lega-
lity control would not have been necessary to create, it would have been 
possible to turn directly to court against unlawful decisions of the local 
governments. 
The other side would have lodged the legality controlling functions 
and appeals against single official matters to the office of the county lo-
cal government. This model as against the presently prevailing one — in 
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Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
which the urban and rural local government is in the centre — would have 
firmly linked up the organisational role of the latter ones with the county 
and for the central government would have resulted in a local govern-
ment system which can easily be influenced. 
Finally, though the county local government remained, the regional 
office of the Comissioner of the Republic was organised to fulfil legality 
controlling functions, the second instance and other official duties. Many 
say that reaching this compromise was possible because it seemed that 
the controlling organ as to its legal status will be relatively independent. 
That is, the requirement against it was to fulfil a balancing role between 
the branches of power. This claim also can be found in the regulation it-
self. The local authority law orders so as the comissioner of the republic 
would not primarily be linked up with the government within the state 
organisation, that this office-bearer should be appointed on the nomina-
tion of the Prime Minister — after a parliamentary committee hearing —
by the President of the republic.  But  it opens up a lot of contradictions, 
the first of which is that the law states that the government with the assis-
tance of the Minister of the Interior through the comissioner of the re-
public controls legality in the local governments. 
The endangered position of the local governments on the whole 
does not originate in the legality controlling authority, as the comissioner 
of the republic cannot take any real action, he can only exercise his right 
of initiation. 
This conclusion is also supported by practice. For example, the town 
under survey was concerned with the legality control only twice in the 
first year. In the first case the local government failed to comply with the 
legal conditions concerning the election of an external member to a com-
mittee. It acknowledged the legality comment of the office as right, its 
resolution was set aside and order was restored by another voting. On the 
second occasion the conflict turned to be more serious, as the municipal 
representative body disputed the legal ground of the supervisory notice, 
so apart from the notification to the comissioner of the republic it did not 
, 
take steps to avert the alleged legal offence. The matter which was about 
how the local government officials' wage is calculated, thus fell to the 
jurisdiction of the court. 
So the Hungarian system of control over local governments has re-
stricted means even compared to the West-European models, and it is al-
most exclusively restricted to asking for information and making com-
ments on legality. 11  The comissioner of the republic is not entitled to 
special supervisory rights, he cannot act instead of the local government 
30 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
or eliminate it, though these are rarely exercised in other countries, too, un-
der normal conditions. At the same time local governments several times 
take it amiss that the office of the comissioner of the republic is in lack 
of helpful and advisory conduct. Just on the contrary, the office often re-
fuses to create a permanent work contact between the controlling and the 
controlled which would prevent the infringement of law. 
So legality control does not have a preventive character at all, though 
both in West-European and North-American local authority law a tendency 
of consultations based on mutual interest reconciliation and protection of 
local government autonomy prevails.  E. Becker  quite simply calls advising 
the core of communal contro1. 12  As Hungarian legislators have not taken 
a standpoint on the issue of consultation and professional help, namely if 
it is part of the local government control or belongs to another sphere of 
central-local relations, for the time being the supervisory organ decides 
on whether to make use of advising or not. 
The reason for refusal suggests cautiousness, as among the reasons 
there is usually the observation of local government independence and 
non-interference. Anyway, there is undoubtedly something to be said for 
the regulation, that it is really reduces the relation to legality control. 
So as to give a complete account let's have a look at further scopes 
of authority remitted to the competence of the comissioner of the repub-
lic. It performs certain state administrative duties which are stated in law 
or by the government on grounds of legal authorisation, and co-ordinates 
the activity of his own office and that of other state administrative organs 
which work in the region. So the office can be vested with state adminis-
trative authorities, which goes together with the high risk of the necessa-
ry decentralisation of public administration to fall not exclusively to the 
local governments, since authorities can also be located to the comissio-
ner of the republic. Moreover, governmental authorisation is so wide that 
it makes the extension for the controlling organ to be vested with other 
state administrative authorities almost unlimited. 
The process has already begun. The law concerning the duties and 
spheres of activity of the local governments and their organs, that of the 
comissioner of the republic and certain centrally subordinated organs, ac-
cording to the inherited structure first of all states the spheres of activity 
broken down to branches. Secondly, in fields important for the local go-
vernments, for example public education, social policy, health the go-
vernment has already been authorised to vest state administrative duties 
to the comissioner of the republic. 13  Zs.  Balogh  rightly calls attention that 
there is a chance of a parallel administrative system to come into being, in 
31 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
which the local government administration and the controlling office (or 
further deconcentrated state organs) working parallelly implement the most 
expensive version." 
It is to be feared that this tendency leads to the emptying of self-
government, so proper constitutional guarantees are essential against the 
nationalisation of tasks. The negative influence on the local governments 
independence can only be increased by the other right of the comissioner of 
the republic which is alien from the fundamental legality controlling func-
tion and which is not clear in its content and means. Within the scope of 
this task the comissioner — according to the relevant preamble — actually 
with no limits co-ordinates the activity of its own office, on one hand, 
with that of the different deconcentrated county organs, on the other 
hand, with that of the municipal representative bodies of the county and 
the urban and rural local governments. In addition to this, it co-ordinates 
the activity of the local governments' offices and that of the deconcent-
rated organs. 
In the aspect of external interferences it should be added that the 
office of the municipal representative body is the organ of the municipal 
local government's body. 
The outlined characteristic features of the institution exercising le-
gality control over the local governments make the analyst finish with 
the illusion of independence. Our final doubts are dispelled by the sec-
tion of the local authority law, according to which the Minister of the In-
terior controls the activity of the Comissioners of the Republic. 15  So this 
organ can be defined as a deconcentrated organ with general scope of ac-
tivity, the development line of which is not at all unambiguous. 
At the same time more and more people consider the future role of 
the fact that the comissioners of the republic work in regions, the capital 
city and its districts. Since the Hungarian public administrative system 
has not been divided into regions until recently, the Parliament had to or-
der in a separate resolution about the regions which serve as the basis for 
the comissioner's competency. 
Do the germs of a new regional administration appear hidden in the 
form of a controlling organ? In the opinion of  Gy. Enyedi —  that can be con-
sidered as competent thinks — it is possible that the office of the comissi-
oner of the republic will become the basis of the Hungarian regional go-
vernment. But there would be severe conditions of it, as the union of the 
counties comprising the regions in certain cases can really be considered 
as regions, but in other cases they give the impression of improvisation 
and groundlessness in the aspect of regional relations. 16 
32 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
CONCLUSIONS 
In the closing lines of the study I am trying to outline general correspon-
dences instead of summarising some operational anomalies. The creation 
of the new local governments in Hungary — in spite of its numerous de-
ficiencies — is considered to be a landmark in the establishment of the 
system of democratic institutions. It can be rightly stated that the legally 
ensured freedom and independence of local public legal representative 
bodies is outstanding even compared to European standards. 
It is another matter that in this field the process of foundational le-
gislation has not yet been closed which for the time being makes the ten-
dency in the development of the local government structure unpredictable. 
The lack of legal regulations, the inexperience of the new leading 
elite and the traditional distrust all make it difficult for the local govern-
ments to function. In relation to distrust I would like to mention that this 
factor has played not a minor role in that there is no regional government 
presently in Hungary. The former county which had a middle-level con-
trolling function lost such rights, because as the redistributor of material 
resources it became the embodiment of the centralisation in the state so-
cialism. The desire to be freed from the county which was branded as the 
extended arm of the ex party-state perhaps unduly set the towns and vil-
lages into the limelight. The intention of creating local governments with 
a wide-ranging independence took the attention off the fact that there 
was no proper counterweight of the government on regional level which 
would primarily protect regional interests. Moreover, it also happened 
that a great share of the former county scopes of activity went into the 
deconcentrated organs which were founded by the ministries in large 
numbers. The direct result of it is the growth of the government's signifi-
cance, that is  centralisation. 
In the background of the happenings there is the frittering away of 
the Hungarian public administration, which is just the 'opposite of the in-
ternational tendency. In Hungary, at the time of state socialism — not in-
significant coincidence with similar phenomena in western democracies 
— the fusion of the public administrative units was accomplished within 
the council system. This regional integration was and is attributed to par-
ty-state distortions and centralising efforts, though in its intensity it was 
more moderate than in the west. Though it is undeniable that the country 
in its infrastructure was not prepared for the provision of the newly set up 
regions, which caused disadvantages to quite a number of small villages. 
33 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
Due to the accumulated aversion, in 1990 almost every village 
elected its own municipal representative body. Thus the number of the local 
governments doubled, increased from 1,500 to approximately 3,000. 
There is no strategy presently to cope with the disintegration in 
public administration. There are only germs of the system of ground up 
associations which was proposed by the local authority law. And what is 
even more serious is that as an organical concomitant of the drafted pro-
cess the regional information system has been broken up, nobody cares 
about regional planning and regional interest protection, finally there is 
no co-ordinated regional development. It is necessary to find a way out 
from this chaotic state as soon as possible. 
34 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
NOTES 
1  AGA, A. 1991b., p. 117. 
2  BIHAR', M. 1990. 
3  AGH, A. 1991a. 
4  1990. evi LXV. torveny a helyi onkormanyzatokrol (Act LXV  on  the 
Local Governments) 
5  1990. evi LXV. torveny 24. szakasz (2) bekezdes (Act LXV Section 24, 
Paragraph 2) 
6  WEHLING, H-G. 1986.  
7  PALNE KOVACS,  I. 1991., p. 1025. 
8  1990. evi LXV torveny 102. szakasz (2) bekezdes (Act LXV Section 102, 
Paragraph 2) 
9  In Hungary the regional administrative model of the so-called town 
surroundings (suburban zones) existed from 1971, so for about two 
decades. Although the established mutually close social, economic, 
supply, employment, geographical and transport relations had  to  be 
taken into account when the town surroundings were created, in reali-
ty they were primarily organised in an administration-centred way. The 
professional apparatus of the towns (centres) regularly performed the 
public duties which needed high qualification in the whole of the town 
surroundings. Co-ordinated development of the linked region was 
pushed into the background. The compulsorily raised town surround-
ing fund served the purpose of hidden financial support for the com-
munities, mostly financing separate and not jointly implemented pro-
jects. However, it has something to be said for the co-ordination com-
mittees of the town surroundings, for they maintained living relations 
and a dialogue between the towns and villages of a region which were 
connected in some way. 
10 VEREBELYI, I. 1991. p. 773. 
11  Within the scope of legality control over the local governments the 
comissioner of the republic has the following means: setting a deadline 
he calls upon the municipal representative body to stop law infringe-
ment. If the municipal representative body did not take measures to stop 
infringement in the given period, then the the comissioner of the re-
public can exercise his right of initiation. This latter right has three lines. 
35 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
He can ask the review and annulment of illegal decrees of the local go-
vernment at the Constitutional Court, and that of illegal resolutions at 
the court. He can also initiate the convocation of the municipal repre-
sentative body in order to stop infringement, and state the body offi-
cial's responsibility. None of the measures taken by the the comissioner 
of the republic has a delaying force upon the contested legal act. 
12  BECKER, E. 1965. 
13  1991. evi XX. torveny A helyi onkormanyzatok es szerveik, a kortar-
sasagi megbizottak, valamint egyes centralis alarendeltsegii szervek 
feladat- es hataskoreir61 (Act XX on the Scopes of Duties and Author-
ities of the Local Governments and their Organs, that of the Comissio-
ners of the Republic and Certain Centrally Subordinated Organs) 
14  BALOGH, ZS. 1991. 
15  1990. evi LXV. tOrveny 96. szakasz (e) pont (Act LXV, Section 96, 
Point (e)) 
16  ENYEDI, GY. 1991. 
36 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
AGH, A. (1991a): Az elitcseretol a rendszervaltasig (From the change of 
elite to the change of regime). —  Juss,  1. pp. 109-119. 
AGH, A. (1991b): A teremto kaosz. A politikai atmenet elso szakaszarol 
(The creative chaos. On the first stage of the political transition). —  Tar-
sadalmi Szemle,  10. pp. 3-11. 
BALOGH, ZS. (1990): A hatalommegosztas dimenzioi (Dimensions of 
the division of power). — Jogtudomanyi Kozldny, 1.  pp. 1-8. 
BALOGH, ZS. (1991): Onallo hatalmi ág vagy a vegrehajto hatalom re-
sze (Independent Branch of Power or Part of the Executive Tower)  — 
Tcirsadalmi Szemle,  10. pp. 52-58. 
BECKER, E. (1965):  Entwicklung der deutschen Gemeinden and Gemein- 
deverbande im Hinblick auf die Gegenwart.  Berlin, Springer Verlag 
BIHARI, M. (1991): Rendszervaltas es hatalomvaltas Magyarorszagon 
(1989-1990) (Change of regime and change of power in Hungary). —
In:  KURTAN, S. — SANDOR, P. — VASS, L. (eds.): Magyarorszag 
evkonyve.  Budapest, Okonomia Alapitvany—Ecomix Rt. pp. 33-48. 
ENYEDI, GY. (1991): Regiok Magyarorszaga (Hungary of the regions). 
— Tarsadalmi Szemle,  7. pp. 31-35. 
HORVATH, GY. (ed.)(1991):  A magyar regionalis politika sillypontjai 
(Main points of the Hungarian regional policy). Pecs, MTA Regiona-
lis Kutatasok Kozpontja (Manuscript) 
HORVATH, M. T. (1991):  A partok intezmenyes szerepe a helyi kor-
manyzatok makodeseben  (The institutional role of the parties in the acti-
vity of local governments). Budapest. (PhD. thesis, manuscript) 
IVANCSICS, I. (1991): A helyi onkormanyzatok kapcsolata a kozponti 
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cal governments with the central state organs and the the comissioner of 
the republic). — Juss, 3. pp. 29-36. 
37 

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Pfeil, Edit : Local Governments and System Change. The Case of a Regional Centre. 
Pécs: Centre for Regional Studies, 1992. 38. p. 
Discussion Papers, No. 15.
KALTENBACH, J. (1990): Az onkormanyzatok feletti feliigyelet esz-
kozrendszerenek nyugat-europai modellje (The Western-European 
model of the system of means in the control over local governments). 
— Magyar Kozigazgatas,  12. pp. 1073-1098. 
KRONER, H. (1981): Ausschiisse, Komissionen und Deputationen. — In: 
PUTTNER, G. (ed.): Handbuch der kommunalen Wissenschaft und 
Praxis. II. Band. Berlin, Springer Verlag. pp. 129-144. 
PALNE KOVACS, I. (1990): A helyi politika  (Local politics). — Teraleti 
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PALNE KOVACS, I. (1991): Politizalo helyi onkormanyzatok (Politicis- 
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PFEIL, E. (1990):  A kiskozsegek az einkormanyzatta valas fit*  (Small 
communities on the way of becoming local self-governments). — Ku-
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PFEIL, E. (1991): Onallosag es egymisra utaltsag a Baranya megyei kis-
telepiilesek szempontjab61 (Independence and interdependence in the 
aspect of small villages in Baranya county). —  Magyar Kozigazgatas, 
8. pp. 750-755. 
VEREBELYI, I. (1991): A helyi onkormanyzatok alapvonalai (Rudi- 
ments of local governments).  — Magyar Kozigazgatas,  9. pp. 769-781. 
WEHLING, H-G. (1986):  Kommunalpolitik in der BRD.  Berlin, Collo-
quium Verlag 
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Miinchen, Beck Verlag 
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38 

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Discussion Papers 1992. No. 15. 
Local Governments and System Change. 
The Case of a Regional Centre
The Discussion Papers series of the Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungar-
ian Academy of Sciences was launched in 1986 to publish summaries of re-
search findings on regional and urban development. 
The series has 3 or 4 issues a year. It will be of interest to geographers, econo-
mists, sociologists, experts of law and political sciences, historians and every-
body else who is, in one way or another, engaged in the research of spatial 
aspects of socio-economic development and planning. 
The series is published by the Centre for Regional Studies. 
Individual copies are available on request at the Centre. 
Postal address 
Centre for Regional Studies of Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
P.O. Box 199,7601 PECS, HUNGARY 
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Forthcoming  in the Discussion Papers series 
Culture and Urban Development 
(The Case of Pecs) 
by 
Gyula, HORVATH 

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Discussion Papers 1992. No. 15. 
Local Governments and System Change. 
The Case of a Regional Centre
Papers published  in the Discussion Papers series 
No. 1 OROSZ, Eva (1986): Critical Issues in the Development of Hungarian 
Public Health with Special Regard to Spatial Differences 
No. 2 ENYEDI, Gyorgy — ZENTAI, Viola (1986): Environmental Policy in 
Hungary 
No. 3 HAJDU, Zoltan (1987): Administrative Division and Administrative 
Geography in Hungary 
No. 4 SIKOS T., Tamas (1987): Investigations of Social Infrastructure in Ru-
ral Settlements of Borsod County 
No. 5 HORVATH, Gyula (1987): Development of the Regional Management 
of the Economy in East-Central Europe 
No. 6 PALNE KOVACS, Ilona (1988): Chance of Local Independence in 
Hungary 
No. 7 FARAGO, Laszlo — HRUBI, Laszlo (1988): Development Possibilities 
of Backward Areas in Hungary 
No. 8 SZORENYINE KUKORELLI, Iren (1990): Role of the Accessibility in 
Development and Functioning of Settlements 
No. 9 ENYEDI, Gyorgy (1990): New Basis for Regional and Urban Policies 
in East-Central Europe 
No. 10 RECHNITZER, Janos (1990): Regional Spread of Computer Technol-
ogy in Hungary 
No. 11 SIKOS T., Minas (1992): Types of Social Infrastructure in Hungary 
No. 12 HORVATH, Gyula — HRUBI, Laszlo (1992): Restructuring and Re-
gional Policy in Hungary 
No. 13 ERDOSI, Ferenc (1992): Transportation Effects on Spatial Structure of 
Hungary 
No. 14 PALNE KOVACS, Ilona (1992): The Basic Political and Structural 
Problems in the Workings of Local Governments in Hungary 

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